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Abstract
We study how women’s choices over labor activities in village economies correlate with poverty
and whether enabling the poorest women to take on the activities of their richer counterparts can
set them on a sustainable trajectory out of poverty. To do this we conduct a large-scale randomized
control trial, covering over 21,000 households in 1,309 villages surveyed four times over a seven year
period, to evaluate a nationwide program in Bangladesh that transfers livestock assets and skills to
the poorest women. At baseline, the poorest women mostly engage in low return and seasonal casual
wage labor while wealthier women solely engage in livestock rearing. The program enables poor
women to start engaging in livestock rearing, increasing their aggregate labor supply and earnings.
This leads to asset accumulation (livestock, land and business assets) and poverty reduction, both
sustained after four and seven years. These gains do not crowd out the livestock businesses of non-
eligible households while the wages these receive for casual jobs increase as the poor reduce their labor
supply. Our results show that: (i) the poor are able to take on the work activities of the non-poor but
face barriers to doing so, and, (ii) one-oﬀ interventions that remove these barriers lead to sustainable
poverty reduction. JEL Classiﬁcation: J22, O12.
*Earlier drafts were circulated under the titles “Can Basic Entrepreneurship Transform the Economic Lives
of the Poor?” and “The Misallocation of Labor in Village Economies”. We thank all BRAC staﬀ and especially
Sir Fazle Abed, Mushtaque Chowdhury, Mahabub Hossain, W.M.H. Jaim, Imran Matin, Anna Minj, Muhammad
Musa and Rabeya Yasmin for their collaborative eﬀorts in this project. We thank Wahiduddin Mahmud and
Hafeez Rahman of the IGC Bangladesh oﬃce and Clare Balboni for outstanding research assistance. We thank the
editor, Larry Katz, three anonymous referees as well as Arun Advani, Orazio Attanasio, Abhijit Banerjee, Timothy
Besley, Gharad Bryan, Francisco Buera, Anne Case, Arun Chandrasekhar, Jonathan Colmer, Angus Deaton, Dave
Donaldson, Esther Duﬂo, Pascaline Dupas, Greg Fischer, Doug Gollin, Chang-Tai Hsieh, Dean Karlan, Eliana
La Ferrara, Costas Meghir, Ted Miguel, Mushﬁq Mobarak, Benjamin Olken, Michael Peters, Steve Pischke, Mark
Rosenzweig, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, Juan Pablo Rud, Jeremy Shapiro, Chris Udry, Chris Woodruﬀ and numerous
seminar and conference participants for useful comments. This project was ﬁnanced by BRAC and its CFPR-TUP
donors, including DFID, AusAID, CIDA and NOVIB, OXFAM-AMERICA. This document is an output from
research funding by the DFID as part of the iiG. Support was also provided by the IGC. The views expressed are
not necessarily those of DFID. Rasul acknowledges funding by the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis
of Public Policy at IFS (grant number RES-544-28-5001). All errors remain our own.
1
I.Introduction
As of today around a billion people are deemed to be living in extreme poverty. Since labor is
their primary endowment, attempts to lift them out of poverty require us to understand the link
between poverty and labor markets and whether policy interventions that move them into higher
return labor activities can set them on a sustainable trajectory out of poverty. To shed light on
the issue we combine a detailed labor survey that tracks over 21; 000 households, drawn from the
entire wealth distribution in 1; 309 rural Bangladeshi villages, four times over a seven year period,
with the randomized evaluation of the nationwide roll-out of a program that transfers assets and
skills to the poorest women in these villages.
Our survey gathers detailed data on hours worked, days worked and earnings for each labor
activity of each household member. We ﬁnd that, at baseline, the choice of labor activity for women
is limited as they allocate over 80% of hours worked to three activities: maid services, agricultural
labor and livestock rearing. These labor activities are strongly correlated with poverty: poor
women engage mostly in casual wage labor as maids and agricultural laborers, while wealthier
women specialize in livestock rearing. The main diﬀerences between these activities are that
the returns to casual wage labor are lower and work is only available on some days of the year.
Consequently, we ﬁnd that poor women work two months less per year than wealthier women.
These ﬁndings are consistent with evidence in other settings where the rural landless poor are
employed in low-pay and insecure activities (Bardhan 1984a; Dreze 1988; Dreze and Sen 1991;
Rose 1999; Kaur 2015).1
The key question we examine in the paper is whether enabling the poorest women to take on
the same work activities as the better oﬀ women in their villages can set them on a sustainable
path out of poverty. To answer this question we evaluate BRAC’s Targeting the Ultra-Poor
(TUP) program that provides a one-oﬀ transfer of assets and skills to the poorest women with
1According to the Indian National Sample Survey (NSS), 46% of the female rural workforce have agricultural
wage employment as their main occupation. As is also the case in our setting for maids and agricultural laborers,
98% of agricultural wage employment is through casual employment typiﬁed by spot markets (Kaur 2015). On the
fact that such agricultural wage employment is only available on some days of the year, Khandker and Mahmud
(2012) and Bryan et al. (2014) document how lean seasons between planting and harvesting are observed throughout
South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and are characterized by a lack of demand for casual wage labor and higher
grain prices as food becomes scarce. As a result, households face extreme poverty and food insecurity.
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the aim of instigating occupational change. Intuitively, if the poor face barriers to entering high
return work activities and this is what keeps them in poverty, we expect program beneﬁciaries
to change their labor allocation and escape poverty once such barriers are removed. Because the
intervention is bundled, however, we cannot measure the separate relevance of credit constraints
and skills constraints, both of which could be relaxed by the program.2 Of course, the one-oﬀ
asset transfer mechanically reduces poverty in the very short run because it makes beneﬁciaries
instantly wealthier and they can consume that wealth. The question of interest here is whether
such one-oﬀ asset and skills transfers set the poorest households on a sustainable trajectory out of
poverty, where their consumption and asset holdings keep increasing long after the one-oﬀ transfer,
as they are able to alter their labor allocation permanently.
To evaluate the causal impacts of the program, we randomly assign forty BRAC branch oﬃces
serving 1; 309 villages to either treatment or control for four years. A participatory wealth ranking
is conducted before baseline in both treatment and control villages, followed by the application
of TUP eligibility criteria by BRAC oﬃcers. This process classiﬁes households into four groups
in all villages: ultra-poor, near-poor, middle class and upper class. Ultra-poor households, who
account for 6% of the population, are eligible to receive the program whereas other households are
ineligible. We survey all the ultra-poor and near-poor households and a 10% sample of the middle
and upper class households. Our design is thus a partial population experiment (Moﬃtt 2001)
that allows us to identify indirect treatment eﬀects on ineligible households at diﬀerent points of
the wealth distribution as well as distributional eﬀects, namely the extent to which the ultra-poor
close the gap with the next wealth class. This is relevant because the program aims to induce
occupational change among ultra-poor women to take on the same work activities as richer women
(livestock rearing). It is thus natural to trace through the economic impacts on richer women as
they face increased competition in output markets for livestock produce, and in markets related
to inputs into livestock rearing.
We ﬁnd the program transforms the labor activity choices of ultra-poor women. Four years after
2Indeed, this is a bundled, multi-faceted program that also provides some consumption support in the ﬁrst 40
weeks post asset transfers, as well as health support and training on legal, social and political rights across the two
years of the program. As discussed throughout, we do not aim to separate out the impacts of each component.
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the transfer, they devote 217% more hours to livestock rearing, 17% fewer hours to agricultural
labor and 26% fewer hours to maid services relative to their counterparts in control villages.
Aggregating across labor activities, there is a net positive eﬀect on hours worked and days worked
of 17% and 22%, respectively, suggesting poor women had idle work capacity and that the program
enables them to put it to a productive use by taking on livestock rearing activities. Overall, the
results demonstrate that the poor are able to take on the labor activities of the non-poor but face
barriers to doing so, which the one-oﬀ asset and skills transfers from the program relax.
The reallocation of labor supply across work activities by the ultra-poor leads their earnings to
be 21% higher than their counterparts in control villages, and the probability of being below the
$1:25 extreme poverty line is 14% lower. Per capita consumption expenditure is 11% higher and
the value of household durables is 57% higher, with both eﬀects being larger after four years than
after two. In line with this, earnings from livestock rearing are not entirely consumed, but used to
save and invest further in productive assets. Four years post-transfer, the ultra-poor in treatment
villages have more than four times the amount of savings and they are more likely to receive and
give loans to other households. Moreover, the value of cows they own is over twice as large (net
of the value of the asset transfer itself) and they also accumulate business assets such as livestock
sheds, rickshaws, vans, pumps and trees whose value is over 159% larger than for the controls over
the same period.3 More importantly they gain access to land, which is the key productive asset in
these villages. Relative to controls, treatment households are 139% more likely to rent land, 45%
more likely to own land and the value of their landholdings is 82% higher.
Since individuals are likely to diﬀer in their ability to raise livestock and manage a small
business, the eﬀect of the program is likely to be heterogeneous. The scale of our evaluation,
covering more than 6; 000 ultra-poor households, allows us to estimate quantile treatment eﬀects
(QTE). These indeed reveal a large degree of heterogeneity: the eﬀect on the 95th centile of
consumption, for instance, is ten times larger than the eﬀect on the 5th centile and diﬀerences for
savings and productive assets are even larger.
3Land is the key asset in the densely populated rural areas of Bangladesh we study. Laboring for others is
necessary, in part, because the ultra-poor do not have access to land and livestock rearing is a viable alternative,
in part, because it does not require a land input (Bardhan 1984a).
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The eﬀects of the program on the labor allocation of the beneﬁciaries raise the possibility that
ineligible households residing in treatment villages might be aﬀected through general equilibrium
eﬀects, such as changes in livestock produce prices. Our estimates of the indirect treatment eﬀects
on ineligibles however show no evidence that the livestock rearing businesses of richer women are
crowded out by the entrance of the poor into this activity: they neither reduce their labor supply
nor experience a signiﬁcant reduction in earnings. A likely explanation for these muted impacts
is that even after four years, the ultra-poor still constitute a relatively small share of the market
overall. In contrast, we do ﬁnd general equilibrium impacts on the casual wage labor activities that
the ultra-poor dominated at baseline: after four years, the agricultural and maid wages paid to
ineligible women in treatment villages are 9% and 11% higher than in control. At the same time,
the hours the ineligible devote to these work activities are lower, so their earnings are unaﬀected.
The partial population experiment design also allows us to estimate treatment eﬀects of the
program on the gap between wealth classes and so shed light on the distributional consequences
of the intervention. This exercise reveals that the ultra-poor close the gap with the near-poor in
consumption expenditures and household assets, while on other dimensions they actually overtake
this group and end up with four times the level of savings and twice the value of productive assets.
The program thus has powerful distributional impacts, both between wealth classes as well as
within the ultra-poor, as highlighted by the quantile treatment eﬀect estimates.
At a combined cost of USD 1; 120 in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms per household, both
the asset and skill components constitute large transfers benchmarked against the baseline wealth
and human capital of the ultra-poor.4 We can use our estimates to benchmark the program’s
beneﬁts against its costs. Under the assumption that the estimated consumption beneﬁts at
year four are repeated over 20 years, the program has an average beneﬁt/cost ratio of 3.2. The
estimated internal rate of return (IRR) of the program is between 16% and 22%, depending on
the assumed opportunity cost of time that must be taken into account as the program causes the
ultra-poor’s labor supply to increase overall.
The ﬁnal part of the analysis sheds light on long term impacts of the intervention. To do so
4Throughout the paper we stick to the convention of reporting values in USD PPP terms.
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we surveyed the same households again in 2014, seven years after the intervention began. While
20% of the control group residing in 49% of the control villages had been treated by then, we are
able to derive a lower bound for the eﬀect of the program after seven years, as well as compute
other bounds by using our QTE estimates to create counterfactuals for the treated controls. This
comparison reveals that changes after seven years are at least as large as the four year impacts.
While these results must be interpreted with caution as our counterfactuals might be imperfect,
a major trend break would be needed to reverse the conclusion that the original beneﬁciaries are
escaping poverty at a steady rate.
Overall the results show that one-oﬀ asset and skills transfers to the ultra-poor enable them
to overcome barriers to accessing high return labor activities. These reallocations of labor supply
across work activities lead to increases in their consumption, and a diversiﬁcation of their asset
base, especially through accessing land, and this process sets them on a sustained trajectory out
of poverty.
By the end of our study in 2014, the program had reached 360; 000 households in Bangladesh
containing 1.2 million individuals, and it has subsequently been piloted in other countries (Banerjee
et al. 2015a). We compare our results for Bangladesh to those from six pilot studies in Ethiopia,
Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan and Peru (Banerjee et al. 2015a). Across ten dimensions
covering consumption, food security, assets, ﬁnancial inclusion, labor supply, income, physical
health, mental health, political awareness and women’s empowerment, we ﬁnd the three year
results for these pilot studies are strikingly similar to our four year results. The fact that the
program has positive eﬀects across such a wide range of outcomes increases conﬁdence that it has
a profound eﬀect on the lives of ultra-poor women. The comparison of our ﬁndings to those of other
pilots suggests that speciﬁcally promoting occupational change is eﬀective in diﬀerent contexts.
This lends support to the argument that the program may be able to be scaled-up in diﬀerent
contexts with diﬀerent implementing partners to achieve sizable and sustainable improvements in
outcomes for the poorest.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes key features of rural labor markets
underlying our analysis. Section III describes the TUP intervention, our data and research design.
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Section IV documents treatment eﬀects on the ultra-poor. Section V looks across the wealth
distribution to provide estimates of indirect treatment eﬀects on ineligible households and the
extent to which the ultra-poor close the gap with the near-poor. Section VI presents a cost-
beneﬁt analysis and estimates internal rates of return. Section VII examines the trajectories of
beneﬁciaries after seven years. Section VIII concludes by discussing the broader implications of
our study.
II.Labor Markets and Poverty at Baseline
II.A Poverty and Wealth Classes
We study labor markets in 1; 309 villages in Bangladesh’s 13 poorest districts. These districts
were chosen by BRAC to implement the TUP program based on food security maps of the World
Food Program. Our sample is drawn from two randomly selected sub-districts in each district,
containing 40 BRAC branches that serve the 1; 309 villages where the evaluation takes place.5
To construct our sample we ﬁrst conducted a census of the 99; 775 households in the 1; 309
villages. To draw a sample for the baseline survey, we combine this data with information on
household wealth, derived from a participatory wealth ranking organized by BRAC in each village.
This exercise places all households into one of several wealth bins corresponding to the poor, the
middle class, and the upper class. Pre-randomization, BRAC oﬃcers use inclusion and exclusion
criteria to further subdivide the poorer households into the ultra-poor, who are eligible for the
TUP program, and the near-poor who are not. The four wealth classes account for 6%, 22%,
59% and 14% of the village populations, respectively (Table I). We survey almost all ultra-poor
and near-poor households, and a 10% random sample of households from higher wealth classes,
at baseline in 2007 and then at follow-ups in 2009, 2011 and 2014. Overall the sample covers
over 21; 000 households in 1; 309 villages, of which over 6; 700 are ultra-poor. Our research design
allows us to study the program’s: (i) intent-to-treat eﬀect on the ultra-poor, where the number
of ultra-poor households that we track allows us to further estimate quantile treatment eﬀects to
5There is a concentration of study sites in the Northern part of the country. This is because this is the poorest
and most vulnerable region, often referred to as the monga or famine region (Bryan et al. 2014). Our evaluation
is representative of the areas in which the nationwide TUP program was scaled-up in after 2007.
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shed light on heterogeneous impacts of the program among the ultra-poor; (ii) general equilibrium
and distributional impacts on near-poor, middle class and upper class households.
The top two panels of Table I conﬁrm that the participatory ranking exercise is successful in
identifying the poorest households: 53% of the households identiﬁed as ultra-poor are below the
$1:25 a day poverty line, while the corresponding ﬁgures for the near-poor, middle and upper
classes are 49%, 37% and 12%. Due to BRAC’s targeting strategy, the primary woman is the
sole earner in 41% of the ultra-poor households, while this only occurs in 25%, 14% and 12%
of near-poor, middle and upper class households. Illiteracy is also much higher for ultra-poor
women: a staggering 93% of them are illiterate compared to 83%, 74% and 49% in the other three
wealth classes. These data conﬁrm that the ultra-poor are severely disadvantaged relative to their
wealthier counterparts in the same village. They also conﬁrm that these village economies have a
signiﬁcant fraction of middle and upper class households lying below the extreme poverty line.
Looking across household assets, savings, livestock, land and business assets the distinguishing
feature of the ultra-poor is that they are largely assetless. As we look across the columns of Table
I all these variables are larger for wealthier households.
The value of cows owned by the ultra-poor is only 2:2% of the value owned by the upper classes
and the corresponding ﬁgure for goats is 11:1%. This gap in the value of livestock is driven both
by the ultra-poor being much less likely to own livestock (particularly cows) and then conditional
on owning livestock being more likely to own goats (the average value of which is close to USD 54
in PPP terms) rather than cows (the average value of which is USD 542). As households get richer
they focus on accumulating cows not goats with the former accounting for 96% of the value of
livestock owned by upper class households. Therefore, as the comparison of cow and goat values
in Table I shows, cows are the key livestock asset in these village economies. Table I also shows
that rental markets do not equalize access to productive assets: only 7% of the poor in our sample
rent in cows from other households. This is likely because of various transaction costs associated
with renting out livestock to others, which have been shown to be relevant in rural labor markets
(Shaban 1987, Foster and Rosenzweig 1994).6
6Even though wealthier households can in principle gain by renting livestock to the poor to take advantage of
their lower labor costs, the transaction costs from doing so are high for at least three reasons: (i) the ultra poor lack
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The ﬁnal panel of Table I shows that the poor are much less likely to own land than wealthier
households. Only 7% of ultra-poor households own land at baseline compared to 11%, 49% and
91% for near-poor, middle class and upper class households. In addition only a small fraction of
the ultra-poor, 6%, rent land for cultivation. The majority of ultra-poor households are therefore
landless and the value of land they own is tiny compared to middle class and upper class households.
Land is the asset that most clearly diﬀerentiates rich from poor households in these villages.
What is also clear from Table I is that inequality in asset holdings across the village wealth
distribution is much more marked than inequality in consumption. Average consumption expen-
diture per adult equivalent for ultra-poor households is 51% of that for upper class households.
The corresponding ﬁgures for household assets, savings, business assets, value of cows, value of
goats and value of land owned are 2:2%, 1:6%, 1:5%, 2:2%, 11% and 0:5%. The upper classes in
the villages are distinguished mainly by owning more assets, particularly agricultural land. The
ultra-poor, in contrast, have negligible asset holdings.
These characteristics of ultra-poor women combined with the fact that they have a median
age of 40 and an average of one dependent child below the age of 10 imply that they are likely to
be captive in these village labor markets. Migration to other labor markets in towns and cities is
unlikely to be a possibility for the majority of ultra-poor women. In common with many ultra-poor
women around the world they have to choose from the work activities on oﬀer within the villages
where they currently reside.7
II.B Labor Markets
Our survey collects information on all labor activities, for each household member, during
the previous year. For each activity, we ask whether the individual was self-employed or hired
by a third party as a wage laborer, the number of hours worked per day, the number of days
experience of livestock rearing: for centuries they have been landless and engaged in casual wage labor activities;
(ii) the quality of labor inputs in livestock rearing are critical: there can be large variations in the productivity of
livestock due to diﬀerences in feeding, veterinary and other practices; (iii) the economic opportunities of wealthier
households means they face high opportunity costs of supervising, or training, other households when rearing
livestock. More generally, Shaban (1987) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) provide evidence of the importance of
moral hazard in labor contracts in rural India.
7Later we present experimental evidence that the program did not lead to diﬀerential attrition in treatment
versus control villages which is consistent with this hypothesis. Cultural barriers also imply that migration, and in
particular seasonal migration, is typically practised by males in Bangladesh (Bryan et al. 2014).
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worked per year, wage rates and total earnings. We collect data related to the entire year because
employment in casual wage jobs, especially those in agriculture, is irregular so a that a shorter time
frame (days, weeks) is likely to severely mis-measure aggregate hours devoted to these activities.
As the program targets the primary woman in ultra-poor households, deﬁned as the head’s spouse
or the female head, we focus the analysis on women’s labor market activities.8
Figure IA begins to describe the working lives of women in rural Bangladesh. It identiﬁes
the main labor activities in these villages by showing the share of women’s work hours devoted to
various work activities in each of the 40 BRAC branches our sample covers. The ﬁgure reveals that
the set of labor activities that women engage in is extremely limited. Around 80% of women’s labor
hours are devoted to three activities: casual jobs in agriculture, casual jobs as domestic maids and
livestock rearing. The ﬁrst two are activities where unskilled labor is the only input and where
women are hired daily without any guarantee of future employment.9 For the third, women are
self-employed, working with cows and goats to generate income through the sale of milk, meat,
manure and young calves. The key diﬀerence between these two sets of activities is that the latter
requires a capital input. It is also likely that livestock rearing requires higher levels of skills.10
Figure IA shows that while livestock rearing is present in all labor markets, either agricultural
or maid labor tends to dominate in a particular location. Hence in most villages within a given
BRAC branch, women eﬀectively choose between two labor activities – agricultural/maid labor
and livestock rearing.11
Figure IB presents hours of work broken out by wealth class and activity to investigate whether
8Bardhan (1984b) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1996) document a marked diﬀerentiation in agricultural tasks
by gender, which is also observed in our setting.
9In our data 99% (96%) of women working in agricultural wage labor (as maids) report being hired and paid
daily through spot contracts. This is also what Kaur (2015) observes in India using NSS data. We do not therefore
observe coexistence of temporary and permanent wage labor contracts (Eswaran and Kotwal 1985).
10Expertise is needed to (i) give beef cows, dairy cows and goats the right diets, (ii) be able to detect diseases
and know when to contact the vet; (iii) know about vaccines and when they need to be given; (iv) be able to work
with artiﬁcial insemination services (for cows); (v) be able to construct livestock sheds and keep them clean.
11Due to the geographical separation of casual wage labor activities described in Figure IA, agricultural work
and maid work are rarely combined to make a full time job. Only 10% of women who report any wage activity
are engaged in both casual agricultural labor and domestic maid work. We also note that 43% of poor women
generate small amounts of income from poultry: however, the returns from such activities are far lower than even for
casual wage labor. Following the earlier literature that has argued for buﬀer stock motivations of animal ownership
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993), we consider poultry holdings as a form of illiquid savings rather than representing
a key choice over labor market activities.
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there is a correlation between labor market activities and poverty. The ﬁgure demonstrates that
there is a pronounced shift towards livestock rearing as we move up the wealth distribution.
Ultra-poor and near-poor women engage predominantly in casual wage labor, although ultra-poor
women are distinguished from near-poor women by relying almost exclusively on unskilled casual
labor which requires no capital input and where they rely on others to employ them, primarily
as agricultural laborers or domestic maids. In contrast, women from middle and upper class
households are predominantly engaged in livestock rearing. Across all four wealth classes these
three activities account for 80% of hours worked.12
Figure IC graphs the hourly returns for the three main work activities averaged over all indi-
viduals with non-missing earnings and positive hours in each of the three activities. We compute
simple averages at the BRAC branch level. Hourly returns for casual jobs are equal to the hourly
wage. To compute average hourly earnings for livestock rearing we divide yearly proﬁts (revenues
minus input costs) by total hours devoted to livestock rearing over the year. Two things are ap-
parent from this plot. The ﬁrst is that the average returns for those engaged in livestock rearing
are higher than those for casual wage labor in nearly all rural labor markets in our sample. Table
A.I shows that, at the village level, hourly earnings in livestock rearing are USD 0:72 per hour,
more than double the hourly earnings for agricultural wage labor (USD 0:34 per hour) and maid
work (USD 0:27 per hour). The choice over labor activities however depends on the marginal
returns to labor in each. For competitive casual wage labor markets, that are governed by spot
contracts without any future employment guarantee, the hourly wage closely matches the MPL.
For capital-intensive activities such as livestock rearing, measuring the MPL requires knowing the
production function for how capital and labor are combined. Assuming a Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology, MPL is proportional to APL, with the constant of proportionality being labor’s share of
income. Given the measured returns across activities, we note that for the average branch, the
MPL in livestock rearing is larger than the MPL in agricultural (maid) work as long as the labor
12The remaining 20% of hours is distributed across several other activities which typically account for less than
1% of hours each (where work on the household’s own land is counted as own cultivation not agricultural labor).
The activities that account for more than 1% for the ultra-poor are: begging (6%), tailoring (4%), casual day labor
outside agriculture (4%), land cultivation (1%). For the near-poor they are: begging ( 3%), tailor (3%), casual
day labor outside agriculture (3%), land cultivation (4%). For the middle classes they are: tailoring (3%), land
cultivation (4%). For the upper classes they are: tailoring (1%), teacher (1%), land cultivation (5%).
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share is larger than :48 (:37). Macro-wide estimates from developing countries typically lie in the
range of :65-:80 (Gollin 2002).13
The second observation from Figure IC is that returns to casual wage labor are uniform across
space whereas returns to livestock rearing vary strongly across space. The uniformity of returns
to casual labor across geography reﬂects the fact that there is an abundant supply of low skilled
women willing to work in these work activities and wages oﬀered in village spot markets tend to
fall within narrow bands (Kaur 2015). In contrast, returns to livestock rearing vary according to
location-speciﬁc features such as linkages to urban markets and trade networks (Donaldson 2015).
Figure I exposes the puzzle at the heart of our study – why do the poor not allocate their labor
to the activity with the highest return? One possibility is that the observed cross-sectional returns
to activities might not represent the returns available to the poor if they engaged in them. The
diﬀerences could be due to diﬀerences in innate ability correlated with poverty or to increasing
returns to scale. To explore the latter, Figure ID graphs a local polynomial regression of hourly
returns on the value of livestock owned by households. While the estimated returns need to be
cautiously interpreted given livestock holdings are endogenous, across the whole distribution the
returns to livestock rearing are higher than for casual wage labor activities (that themselves do
not vary with livestock ownership as expected). The vertical bars on Figure ID indicate the
average value of livestock owned by the ultra-poor pre- and post- the TUP program intervention
we evaluate. Over this range, the returns to livestock rearing are higher than for both forms of
casual wage labor, and these returns are also clearly rising with livestock value, indicating there
might be increasing returns to livestock rearing.14 Evaluating the TUP program allows us to assess
whether diﬀerences in returns can be explained by diﬀerences in innate ability, or reﬂect multiple
barriers that the poor face in accessing labor activities that they are otherwise able to engage in.
Besides having diﬀerent hourly returns and capital requirements, the two types of work activ-
ities also exhibit a diﬀerent distribution of hours worked across days of the year. Table A.I shows
that the average woman engaged in casual agricultural labor works in this activity for only 127
13A body of ﬁeld experiments examining the returns to capital in developing country contexts ﬁnd that these
returns are higher than the returns to labor (de Mel et al. 2008, Blattman et al. 2014).
14That there are increasing returns to livestock rearing is in line with evidence from other settings in rural South
Asia (Anagol et al. 2014, Attanasio and Augsburg 2014).
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days of the year; engagement in domestic maid work is for only 167 days per year. In contrast,
women engaged in livestock rearing work almost every day of the year. However, conditional on
working, women employed in casual wage activities work many more hours per day: 7:6 daily hours
for casual agricultural work, 7:0 for maid work, versus 1:8 daily hours for livestock rearing. 15
Table II shows the implications of low demand for casual labor on the distribution of hours
worked across wealth classes: over the course of a year, poor women bunch their work into fewer
days of the year than wealthier women, but work more hours in the year overall. This bunching is
driven by the concentration of poor women’s labor supply into casual wage activities that are only
available for less than half the year. In contrast, wealthier women specialize in livestock rearing,
enabling them to smooth their labor supply over the year.
Taken together, the evidence suggests a clear correlation between poverty and labor market
activities with poor women allocating most of their labor to low-return, irregular, casual jobs and
richer women specializing in high-return, regular, livestock rearing. The key question is whether
poor women would be better oﬀ engaging in the same activities as their wealthier counterparts but
face barriers in accessing capital or skills that keep them in poverty. The beneﬁciaries’ response
to the TUP program, which simultaneously relaxes these capital and skills barriers, sheds light on
this question. If ultra-poor women prefer employment in casual jobs they will sell (or rent out)
the asset without changing their labor market choices. If they prefer livestock rearing but face
asset and/or skills related barriers to engaging in such activities, they will retain the asset and
work with it once barriers are removed.
15Absent large ﬁxed costs of daily labor supply or concave daily costs of work eﬀort, women should prefer to
smooth their labor supply. The observed bunching of labor supply for casual wage activities into fewer days of the
year is indicative of constrained or low aggregate demand for both forms of casual wage labor. This is not surprising
for agricultural wage labor because of inherent seasonality in labor demand including the well documented pre-
harvest lean season in the agricultural cycle in Bangladesh, during which the demand for labor is almost non-existent
(Khandker and Mahmud 2012, Bryan et al. 2014).
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III.Intervention and Research Design
III.A The Intervention: TUP
The TUP program is designed and implemented by BRAC to reach the very poorest women in
rural Bangladesh who are not targeted by other forms of assistance. Pre-randomization, eligible
households are selected by BRAC oﬃcers from the list of poor households produced by a village
participatory wealth ranking.16 To qualify for the program, the household needs to have an able
adult woman present, not to be borrowing from a microﬁnance organization or receiving transfers
from government anti-poverty programs, and meet three out of ﬁve inclusion criteria.17 Eligibility
is not conditional on participating in other BRAC activities.
The program targets the leading woman in eligible ultra-poor households. Women are presented
with a menu of assets, each of which can be used in an income generating activity. These assets
include livestock and those relevant for small-scale retail operations, tree nurseries and vegetable
growing. Each asset is oﬀered with a package of complementary training and support.
Of those households identiﬁed as ultra-poor at the outset, 86% eventually receive an asset. The
other 14% either cease to meet the eligibility criteria when transfers are implemented, or choose
not to take-up the program.18 All the oﬀered asset bundles are similarly valued at USD 560 in
PPP terms. The scale of asset transfers corresponds to a near doubling of baseline wealth for
the ultra-poor, values that are far higher than households could borrow through informal credit
markets. All eligible women chose one of the six available livestock asset bundles from the asset
menu and 91% of them choose an asset bundle containing at least one cow. Before the intervention,
the value of livestock owned by the 47% of ultra-poor households with either a cow or a goat at
baseline is just USD 49:7.
16For the participatory wealth ranking exercise, villages are asked to rank all households into wealth bins and
reach a consensus on the wealth class of each household. People who own suﬃcient amounts of land, have a salaried
job, live in a tin or paddy sheafhouse, own cows, goats or other livestock or own a power tiller, rice mill, etc. are
considered wealthy and people who are landless and who own nothing outside their homestead, work as casual
laborers, small traders or beg, do not own any livestock or assets and live in straw houses are considered to be
poor (BRAC 2004). Alatas et al. (2012) show that, compared to proxy means tests, participatory methods result
in higher satisfaction and greater legitimacy.
17The eligibility criteria are (i) total land owned including homestead land does not exceed 10 decimals; (ii) there
is no adult male income earner in the household; (iii) adult women in the household work outside the homestead;
(iv) school-aged children work; and (v) the household has no productive assets.
18It is likely most did not receive assets because they had become ineligible, not because of take-up refusal. For
example, compared to those receiving assets, those who did not were twice as wealthy and more likely to own land.
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Assets are typically transferred one month after choices are ﬁrst made. Eligibles are encouraged
by BRAC to retain the transferred asset for two years, after which they can liquidate it. Thus,
whether the livestock asset is retained or liquidated by the time of our four-year follow up is itself
an outcome of interest that ultimately determines whether the program impacts the long-run
allocation of time across work activities, or just contributes to a potentially short run increase in
household welfare.
The associated support and training package is also valued at around USD 560 per beneﬁciary.
This component comprises initial classroom training at BRAC regional headquarters, followed
by regular assistance through home visits. A livestock specialist visits eligibles every one to two
months for the ﬁrst year of the program, and BRAC program oﬃcers provide weekly visits for two
years post transfer. As the ultra-poor have limited experience with large livestock (particularly
cows), this assistance is designed to cover the life cycle of livestock. Ultimately, this training
component is intended to mitigate earnings risks from working with livestock and to increase the
overall return to livestock rearing.19
The program also provides a subsistence allowance to eligible women for the ﬁrst 40 weeks
after the asset transfer to help smooth any short-run earnings ﬂuctuation due to adjustments
across work activities. This allowance ends 15 months before our ﬁrst follow-up and is therefore
not part of the earnings measures reported. To empower ultra-poor women along non-economic
dimensions the program also provides health support and training on legal, social and political
rights. The program also sets up committees made up of village elites which oﬀer support to
program recipients and deal with any conﬂicts and problems they encounter. Finally, the program
encourages saving with BRAC during the program and borrowing from BRAC microﬁnance at
the end of the program, but neither is a pre-condition to obtain the asset-training bundle.
The program thus represents a bundle of asset and skills transfers. Given the economic cir-
cumstances and life experiences of the ultra-poor, there are good theoretical reasons why these
components need to be oﬀered together. The strong focus on continual training and support over
19Training is designed to help women maintain the animals’ health, maximize the animals’ productivity through
best practices relating to feed and water, learn how to best inseminate animals to produce oﬀspring and milk, rear
calves, and to bring produce to market. The training is suﬃciently long-lasting to enable women to learn how to
rear livestock through their calving cycle and across seasons.
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a two year period is one way in which the TUP program diﬀers from previous asset transfer pro-
grams (Dreze 1990; Ashley et al. 1999). In short, the program can potentially change a number
of dimensions of poor women’s lives. Transferring assets has a large impact on their wealth and
the program provides key asset and skill inputs needed to take on labor activities engaged in by
richer women. Continued support during the period of learning can further improve their chances
of being successful in taking on these activities. It may also make women more assured and con-
ﬁdent that they can take on work activities other than casual labor (including those that are not
encouraged by the program) and may change cultural attitudes toward these women. We evaluate
the full impacts of the bundled version of the program, and thus do not aim to identify speciﬁc
constraints on occupational change that the program may be operating through.
III.B Research Design
The TUP program evaluation sample comes from among the 13 poorest districts in rural
Bangladesh, as described earlier. In most cases we randomly selected two sub-districts (upazilas)
from each district and within each subdistrict we randomly assigned one BRAC branch oﬃce to
be treated and one to be held as a control.20 All villages within an 8 kilometer radius of a treated
BRAC branch receive the program in 2007 while villages in control branches receive it after 2011.
We randomize at the branch rather than village level to mitigate spillovers between treatment and
control villages either through markets or through program oﬃcers. We are evaluating a scaled
version of the TUP program: by 2014, this had reached over 360; 000 households containing 1.2
million individuals.21
For the purpose of the evaluation, the participatory wealth ranking is conducted in both
treatment and control areas and BRAC oﬃcers identify eligible ultra-poor women in identical ways
20The average subdistrict has an area of approximately 250 square kilometers (97 square miles) and constitutes
the lowest level of regional division within Bangladesh with administrative power and elected members. For each
district located in the poorer Northern region we randomly select two subdistricts, and for each district located
in the rest of the country we randomly select one subdistrict, restricting the draw to subdistricts containing more
than one BRAC branch oﬃce. For the one district (Kishoreganj) that did not have subdistricts with more than one
BRAC branch oﬃce, we randomly choose one treatment and one control branch without stratifying by subdistrict.
21A variant of the program where the poor have to repay the cost of the asset transferred to BRAC had reached
an additional 1.1 million households containing 3.6 million members by 2014 (BRAC 2015).The TUP program
started in 2002 and there was a second wave in 2004. The scale of these waves was smaller than the wave that
started in 2007 and these were used, in part, to inform the design of the scale-up that took place in 2007. The
2002-2006 period therefore involved signiﬁcant piloting and experimentation (Hossain and Matin 2004).
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in both areas. To avoid anticipation eﬀects, information about the availability of the program and
eligibility status is not made public until program operations begin in a given area (in mid 2007
in treatment areas, after 2011 in control areas) and the participatory wealth ranking is presented
as a part of regular BRAC activities rather than associated with a speciﬁc program.
Table A.II provides evidence on whether the characteristics of the ultra-poor are balanced
between treatment and control villages. For each outcome considered, we report means and
standard deviations in treatment and control villages (Columns 1 and 2), the p-value on a test
of equality of means (Column 3) and the normalized diﬀerence of means (Column 4). For each
family of outcomes we also report the average standardized diﬀerence following Kling et al. (2007).
The samples are well balanced on outcomes: only one out of 22 tests yields a p-value below :05,
and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal means for any of the average standardized
diﬀerences. Furthermore, Column 4 shows that all normalized diﬀerences are smaller than 1/6th
of the combined sample variation, suggesting linear regression methods are unlikely to be sensitive
to speciﬁcation changes (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009).
Over the four years from baseline to endline, 15% of ultra-poor households attrit, a rate
comparable to other asset transfer program evaluations (Banerjee et al. 2015a). Table A.III
estimates the probability of not attriting as a function of treatment status and baseline work
activities. This shows: (i) attrition rates do not diﬀer between treatment and control villages;
(ii) women engaged in livestock rearing are more likely to be surveyed in all three waves; (iii)
crucially, there is no diﬀerential attrition by baseline work activities between treatment and control
individuals: the coeﬃcients on interaction terms between treatment status and activity choice
at baseline are all precisely estimated and close to zero. To ease comparability our working
sample is based on those households that are tracked in both follow-ups, covering 6; 732 ultra-
poor households.
IV.Treatment Effects on the Ultra-Poor
We evaluate the impacts of the TUP program on individual and household level outcomes ex-
ploiting the experimental variation caused by the random assignment of villages to treatment or
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control. We estimate the following diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation:
yidt =  +
X2
t=1
t (Wt  Ti) + Ti +
X2
t=1
tWt + d + "idt; (1)
where yidt is the outcome of interest for individual/household i in subdistrict d at time t, where
time periods refer to the 2007 baseline (t = 0), 2009 midline (t = 1) and 2011 endline (t =
2). Wt are survey wave indicators. Ti = 1 if individual i lives in a treated community and
0 otherwise. d are subdistrict ﬁxed eﬀects and are included to improve eﬃciency because the
randomization is stratiﬁed by subdistrict. The error term "idt is clustered by BRAC branch, the
unit of randomization. All monetary values are deﬂated to 2007 prices using the Bangladesh
Bank’s rural CPI estimates and converted into USD PPP.
t identiﬁes the intent-to-treat impact of the program on ultra-poor individual/household i
under the twin identifying assumption of random assignment and no spillovers between treatment
and control villages. This estimate compares changes in outcomes among ultra-poor residing in
treated villages pre- and post- intervention, to changes among counterfactual ultra-poor in control
villages in the same subdistrict. As discussed earlier, the ultra-poor are identiﬁed in identical ways
in treatment and control locations pre-randomization. To benchmark the magnitude of the eﬀects
we report the four year eﬀects in percentage of the control mean in the same period throughout.
Speciﬁcation (1) controls for time-varying factors common to ultra-poor in treatment and control
villages, and for all time-invariant heterogeneity within subdistrict. Tables A.VA and A.VB probe
robustness to using an ANCOVA speciﬁcation both pooling the survey waves and running each
separately.22 Table A.VI probes robustness to diﬀerent inference methods that correct for the
small number of clusters: the Young (2016) degrees of freedom correction and the Cameron et al.
(2008) wild-bootstrap method. All results are quantitatively and qualitatively robust to both sets
of changes.
The subsections below test the impact of the program at each step of the causal chain that links
22Table A.V.A reports the estimates of yid = +Ti+y0i +d+"id run separately on the cross-section of eligible
households in 2009 and 2011, where y0i is the baseline (2007) value of yi and all other variables are as deﬁned above.
Table A.V.B reports the estimates of yidt =
P2
t=1 t (Wt  Ti) +
P2
t=1 t
 
Wt  y0i

+
P2
t=1 tWt + d + "idt
where t 2 [1; 2] (1=2009, 2=2011), y0i is the baseline (2007) value of yi and all other variables are as deﬁned
above.
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choices over labor activities to earnings, consumption, savings and investment. The comparison
between two and four year eﬀects reveals whether the eﬀects become stronger over time, which is
important for understanding whether the program sets the ultra-poor on a sustainable trajectory
out of poverty.
IV.A Labor Supply and Earnings
Table III shows program impacts on labor supply (Panel A) and earnings (Panel B) for the
three main labor activities for women in Bangladeshi villages. Column 1 of Panel A shows that
the program succeeds in its aim to induce ultra-poor women to take up livestock rearing: four
years after baseline ultra-poor women allocate 415 more hours to livestock rearing per annum, a
217% increase relative to controls in the same time period. This corresponds to ultra-poor women
working 172 days in this activity per annum representing an increase of 181% relative to controls
(Column 2). Comparing two and four-year impacts we note that the change in hours devoted to
livestock rearing is immediate, in line with the fact that beneﬁciaries move into livestock rearing
as soon as they receive the assets. The increase represents 1:14 more hours per day which matches
well with the time allocation to this activity observed at baseline (Table II).
In short, livestock rearing has become a central element in the working lives of ultra-poor
women. The ﬁndings further indicate that beneﬁciaries continue to own livestock instead of liqui-
dating it for consumption, despite the fact that the value of the transfer is equal to one year’s worth
of consumption for the average adult. They also indicate that beneﬁciaries are able to maintain
the asset once assistance is removed as the eﬀects are sustained after the two years mark.
Columns 3 to 6 show evidence that ultra-poor women start pulling out of casual wage labor
activities. While the change in hours devoted to livestock rearing is immediate, the eﬀect on casual
labor hours is gradual. The reduction in agricultural labor (46 hours, 17% relative to controls)
is not precisely estimated while the fall in maid hours increases in magnitude between two and
four years and is signiﬁcant only after four years (117 hours, 26% relative to controls). This is
consistent with the fact that the wage rate for agricultural labor is higher than that for maid
work (Figure IC and ID and Table A.I). Overall, ultra-poor women are dropping some of the least
attractive casual labor hours but still hold on to the majority even as they signiﬁcantly increase
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livestock hours.23
Aggregating across labor activities, Columns 7 and 8 show that four years post-intervention
total hours worked increases by 206 (17%) and days worked per year increase by 61 (22% more
than in control). This suggests that the poor had idle labor capacity at baseline which they were
able to successfully combine with the bundled asset-skills transfer as a result of the program.
This improvement in the regularity of employment is a key labor market impact of the program.
At baseline ultra-poor women, like many of the poorest women in rural parts of the developing
world, were captive in occupations at the bottom of the employment ladder using labor, their only
endowment. Signiﬁcantly, demand for this labor was highly irregular. The opportunity to engage
in livestock rearing that the program provides allows the women to ﬁll in the days when they had
previously been idle. The shift away in hours devoted to casual wage labor is more gradual. While
economically signiﬁcant, the magnitude of the reduction in hours devoted to casual wage labor
implies that four years after the program ultra-poor women still engage in these activities so that
diﬀerences in labor activities relative to middle and upper class women remain.
Panel B of Table III then focuses on earnings from work activities. In Column 9 we see that
earnings from livestock rearing increase from USD 80 to USD 115 between years two and four
post-intervention. The four year eﬀect is signiﬁcantly larger than the two year eﬀect despite a
modest drop in labor supply (Column 1) indicating that ultra-poor women are becoming more
productive in this activity over time.
In Columns 10 and 12 we see that declines in supply of agricultural labor and maid services are
associated with signiﬁcant increases in wage rates in those activities after four years (by 12% and
21% respectively). These wage eﬀects are insightful as they rule out that the aggregate supply
of casual labor by ultra-poor women is perfectly elastic, as in Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis
(1964). They are consistent with an upward sloping supply curve because as ultra-poor women
23The small scale of livestock rearing that ultra-poor women operate at, corresponding to keeping a couple of
cows or a cow and several goats, may constrain both the labor input and returns to this activity, making continued
engagement in casual wage labor necessary. In other settings, there is also evidence that even small-scale farmers
resort to these occupations because they are unable to cover short-term consumption needs with savings or credit
(Fink et al. 2014). The slightly smaller daily time allocation of ultra-poor women to livestock rearing relative to
other women (Table II shows that pre-intervention, women allocated 1:8 hours per day to livestock rearing) might
also be due to them operating at a smaller scale than middle and upper class women.
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remove their labor from village labor markets for these activities, prices need to rise to clear the
market (Rosenzweig 1978; Rosenzweig 1988; Rose 2001; Jayachandran 2006; Goldberg 2010; Kaur
2015).24 The removal of ultra-poor labor from these activities and the consequent rise in wages
therefore may have positive general equilibrium eﬀects for the wages received by other women in
other wealth classes who continue to work in these activities. We examine this issue in further
detail in Section V.
Increased wages will of course also beneﬁt the majority of ultra-poor women who continue to
devote some hours to agricultural labor and maid services. For agricultural labor we see that the
modest reduction in labor supply and the modest increase in wages cancel out so that there is no
signiﬁcant impact on earnings from this activity (Column 11). In Column 13 we see, however, that
for maid labor the reduction in labor supply dominates the increase in wages and total earnings
from maid labor fall by 22% after four years. This equates to a statistically signiﬁcant loss of USD
25 from casual wage labor per annum after four years (Column 12). This, however, is modest
relative to the gain of USD 115 from livestock rearing over the same period (Column 9).
Aggregating across activities, the reallocation of time from casual labor to a more-than-
oﬀsetting increase in livestock rearing leads to a signiﬁcant increase in net annual earnings (earn-
ings net of input costs of livestock rearing) of 21% relative to controls in the same time period
(Column 14). A key impact of the program therefore is to make earnings from livestock a signiﬁ-
cant additional source of income for ultra-poor households. In short, the program allows women
to both raise their net earnings, and to smooth their labor supply and earnings stream over the
year. Taken together, these imply that the poorest women in these villages are able and willing
to take on the same labor activities as their wealthier counterparts, suggesting that the program
lifted barriers they must have faced to entering such work activities at baseline.25
It is possible that the program may aﬀect the labor market choices of household members
24We can rule out that the wage increases are due to selection, namely to lower paid individuals dropping out of
these activities. Indeed the estimated eﬀect on wages is the same in the balanced sample of individuals that engage
in these activities in all three waves of the survey (see Section V). This is consistent with these being low-skilled
activities that pay similar wages across locations and across the wealth distribution as shown in Figure IC.
25The stability of the impact on net earnings at two and four years post-intervention suggests the ultra poor are
not necessarily being exposed to more intertemporal risk in livestock rearing, even though 2009 was a low rainfall
year in many parts of rural Bangladesh. This is of note given the ﬁndings in Attanasio and Augsburg (2014).
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other than the targeted female and these must be taken into account to evaluate the eﬀects on
household welfare. In Table A.IV we show that, while all household members devote some more
hours to livestock rearing, the eﬀect is about one tenth of the size of that on ultra-poor women
and does not crowd out other work activities or schooling. This allays the potential concern that
the program increases women’s earnings at the expense of the earnings of other family members,
or children’s education. Another possible channel through which the program might aﬀect the
labor market choices of other household members is by inducing some of them to migrate. We
ﬁnd no evidence that this occurs in our setting, likely because 47% of ultra-poor households have
no adult members other than the main woman and her husband (if present) and 35% have just
one, and because females do not typically engage in seasonal migration in Bangladesh for cultural
reasons (Bryan et al. 2014). Given these null impacts on migration, migrant remittances are likely
to play a minor role.26
IV.B Consumption Expenditures, Savings and Credit
Table IV analyzes the consequences of ultra-poor women reallocating their labor supply across
activities, for the welfare of their households. Column 1 shows that relative to the controls, the
share of households below the USD 1:25 poverty line drops by 8:4pp, or 14% after four years. In
Column 2 we see that consumption expenditure per adult equivalent is 11% higher in treatment
relative to control households after four years.27
Program eﬀects are likely to be heterogeneous depending on unobservables such as the innate
ability for livestock rearing and the underlying constraints faced. We test for heterogeneity by
estimating the following quantile treatment eﬀects (QTE) speciﬁcation:
Quant(yid)=iTi + #d, (2)
26On the migration channel we ﬁnd that: (i) household size actually increases, rather than decreases, for treated
households; (ii) this is partly driven by more adults remaining in the household; (iii) there is no signiﬁcant change
in out-migration.
27The consumption expenditure items covered are: food (both purchased and produced, accounting for the
number of people taking meals in the household), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing,
footwear, utensils, textiles, dowries, education, charity and legal expenses. Further decomposition of consumption
expenditures into food and non-food reveals the eﬀect is driven mostly by the latter but nutrition improves as the
consumption of milk and meat increases.
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where yid corresponds to the diﬀerence between the four year and baseline values of outcome y
for individual i in subdistrict d.
Figure IIA shows that treatment eﬀects on consumption are non-negative at each centile, but
they are signiﬁcantly larger at higher centiles with the eﬀect on the 5th centile being roughly one
tenth of that at the 95th centile. Thus even within the narrow group of ultra-poor households, there
is signiﬁcant variation in the eﬀect of treatment. Uncovering the root causes of these diﬀerences
among the ultra-poor represents a key priority for future research.
In Column 3 of Table IV we see that, after four years, household assets (which include jewelry,
sarees, radios, televisions, cell phones, bicycles and furniture) increase in value by 57% relative
to control. The increase in the value of household assets is signiﬁcantly larger after four years
relative to two years. In Figure IIB we see that, although household asset eﬀects are positive and
signiﬁcant for all centiles, asset accumulation is much more pronounced in the upper centiles.28
Columns 4 to 6 of Table IV analyze the impact of the program on ﬁnancial assets. In Column
4 we see that household cash savings held with microﬁnance organizations, banks and saving
guards increase signiﬁcantly after two and four years. Given that ultra-poor household savings
are negligible in the absence of treatment the increase in savings of USD 53 after four years is
highly signiﬁcant and represents a fourfold increase relative to controls. Though it remains a
choice variable, households are encouraged to open and manage savings accounts during the ﬁrst
two years. The fact that the savings eﬀect remains signiﬁcant after four years indicates that
households are choosing to save more two years after there is any encouragement to do so. Figure
IIC shows that as with consumption expenditure and household assets, the program impact on
savings is highly heterogeneous.
In Column 5 of Table IV we see that, after four years, households are 11pp more likely to
receive loans which represents a 50% increase relative to controls. The program is thus enabling
ultra-poor households to obtain access to credit two years after they are encouraged to do so as
part of the program. On the other side of ﬁnancial intermediation, at baseline only 1% of ultra-
poor households give loans (Table I). Column 6 shows that they are 5pp more likely to do so after
28This is consistent with the pattern of eﬀects on consumption although we cannot say whether those who
experience the largest increases in consumption are the same as those who experience large increases in assets.
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four years relative to controls.
The savings, borrowing and lending results all point to improved ﬁnancial inclusion for ultra-
poor households. Moreover, the enhanced lending by the ultra-poor to others is a key indicator
that their ﬁnancial position in the village has improved – a proportion of ultra-poor households
now have surplus capital that they lend to others. This creates another channel through which
the program can aﬀect other households in the village, discussed further in Section V.
IV.C Productive Assets
Table V examines the program’s impacts on the accumulation of productive assets, as this
is central to whether the one-oﬀ asset and skills transfers lead to sustainable gains in welfare.
Columns 1 and 2 analyze the eﬀect on the value of assets transferred by the program, that is cows
and goats. The ﬁrst thing to note is that ultra-poor women mainly choose cows in their asset
transfer package: the mean value of goats transferred is only 8:6% of the value of cows transferred.
In Column 1 we see that, after four years, the value of cows owned by ultra-poor households has
increased by 122% (net of the transfer value) relative to controls. At year four the value of cows
is 16% larger than the value of the asset transfer: the value of cows has increased from USD 485
to USD 540 between years two and four where the original value of the cows transferred was USD
464. This signals that the majority of ultra-poor households have been able to grow the value of
this productive asset via the enlargement of herds. Consistent with this, we can reject the null
that the estimated eﬀect on the number of cows (not shown) is equal to the number transferred.29
Column 2 shows that the value of goats held by ultra-poor households (net of the transfer
value) actually declines after four years suggesting that some animals have been liquidated or
have died. However, after four years, the cow value eﬀect is 26 times the goat value eﬀect so,
overall, ultra-poor households experience a large and signiﬁcant increase in the value of livestock
held as a result of the program.
Land is the key asset in the densely populated rural areas of Bangladesh which are dominated
by agriculture and ultra-poor households have very limited access to cultivable land (see Table I).
In Columns 3-5 we see that the program impacts the access ultra-poor households have to land,
29Set against a backdrop where attempts to transfer cattle to the poor have a highly checkered history this is a
signiﬁcant ﬁnding (Dreze 1990; Ashley et al. 1999).
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even though this is not an explicit aim of the program. Ultra-poor households become 11pp more
likely to rent land after four years, representing a 139% increase relative to controls. In Column 4
we see that ultra-poor households are 2:6pp more likely to own land after four years representing
a 45% increase and the value of land owned increases signiﬁcantly by an average of USD 327 by
four years post-intervention (Column 5). This accumulation of land takes place between years
two and four with the four year eﬀect being signiﬁcantly higher than the two year eﬀect. This
indicates, importantly, that ultra-poor households are using part of the surpluses generated by
their reallocation of labor supply towards livestock businesses, to invest in land acquisition.
The acquisition of assets also extends to other business assets such as livestock sheds, rickshaws,
vans, pumps and trees: Column 6 shows that after four years the value of such assets held by the
ultra-poor is 159% higher relative to the controls. As with land, accumulation of these assets
accelerates between years two and four with the latter eﬀect being signiﬁcantly larger than the
former. This is mostly driven by the acquisition of livestock sheds (an obvious complement to
livestock) and means of transport such as rickshaws and vans.
Combining all productive assets – livestock, land and other business assets – the QTE esti-
mates in Figure IID reveal considerable heterogeneity in gains across the productive asset holding
distribution. No ultra-poor households reduce their holding of productive assets, but households
in the lower centiles gain little. At higher centiles the gains increase markedly. Understanding
the causes of this heterogeneity in returns is critical to comprehending how to reach all ultra-poor
households, and is an important matter to take up in future research.
The materialization of asset accumulation and diversiﬁcation after four years underlines the
value of having longer run data to study poverty trajectories. We return to examine the issue in
Section VII, where we exploit data tracking the same ultra-poor households seven years after the
program ﬁrst started.
IV.D Comparison with Program Eﬀects in Other Contexts
The program evaluated in this paper was started by BRAC in 2002 in Bangladesh and is
still the only fully scaled version of the program which, by the end of our study in 2014, had
reached over 360; 000 ultra-poor households containing 1.2 million individuals. It has served as a
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template for similar programs that have been implemented in a variety of contexts by diﬀerent
implementing partners. Results from randomized evaluations of pilots of these programs in six
countries – Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan and Peru – have recently been published
(Banerjee et al. 2015a).30 Our analysis diﬀers from those in Banerjee et al. (2015a) in four
respects: (i) we collect information on hours worked in every labor activity over the course of
one year rather than the last 24 hours or week and this allows us to minimize measurement error
due to the fact that most jobs are seasonal or casual; (ii) we survey all beneﬁciaries in the scaled
up version of the program rather than a sample in pilot versions and this allows us to estimate
the full distribution of treatment eﬀects; (iii) we survey a representative sample of households
across the entire wealth distribution rather than ultra-poor households only and this allows us to
quantify general equilibrium eﬀects as well as the distributional eﬀects of the program; (iv) we
track beneﬁciaries four and seven years after the intervention rather than three, and this allows
us to study poverty trajectories.31
Using our data from Bangladesh we replicate the ten key outcome variables studied in Banerjee
et al. (2015a). These are all index variables capturing changes along ten dimensions – consumption,
food security, assets, ﬁnancial inclusion, labor supply, income, physical health, mental health,
political awareness and women’s empowerment.32
Table VI contains a comparison of the eﬀects we observe in our study after four years relative
to those observed by Banerjee et al. (2015a) after three years. What is striking is how similar
the pattern of eﬀects is across the broad set of ten outcome variables. In all settings: (i) per
30The implementing partners, mainly NGOs some of which received state support (e.g. Pakistan, Ethiopia)
visited or were visited by BRAC Bangladesh at least twice during the design phase to seek guidance on program
design. Thus, though they had to be adapted to particular circumstances of a country these programs share many
of the features of the Bangladeshi BRAC TUP program.
31In three sites, Ghana, Honduras and Peru, Banerjee et al. (2015a) randomize the treatment both within and
across villages and thus measure spillovers on non-treated ultra-poor. Our design, in contrast, allows us to measure
spillovers on households across the wealth distribution as well distributional changes. In one site, West Bengal,
beneﬁciaries are resurveyed seven years after the intervention and a preliminary note (Banerjee et al. 2016) reports
that, consistent with our evidence in Section VII, the program has lasting impacts.
32The online Appendix describes the construction of outcome variables that we use to compare with Banerjee et
al. (2015a) and notes any diﬀerences in how our variables are constructed. Even though the survey instruments
were designed independently, we are able to construct similar variables along each of the ten outcome dimensions.
The exceptions are mental health and political awareness where we use variables that diﬀer somewhat from Banerjee
et al. (2015a). Furthermore, for labor supply we use annual labor supply converted to a daily measure to account
for seasonal variation whereas Banerjee et al. (2015a) use labor supply as measured for the past 48 hours or week.
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capita (non-durable) consumption and food security (which captures food adequacy and whether
meals are skipped) is signiﬁcantly increased by the program (Columns 1 and 2); (ii) households are
accumulating more household and productive assets as well as saving, borrowing and lending more
(Columns 3 and 4); (iii) adult labor supply, both for the main woman in Bangladesh (Column 5)
and for all adults in the six pilots (Column 6) also increases; (iv) income and revenues received
by the main ultra-poor woman are increased (Column 7).33
This comparison of studies bolsters the external validity of the scaled version of the program
we have evaluated in Bangladesh. In a variety of settings the combined evidence suggests the
arrival of livestock rearing opportunities for the ultra-poor, through asset and skill transfers and
other components of the TUP approach, enables them to expand their labor supply, increase their
income and accumulate assets. This, in turn, leads to improvements in welfare along consumption
and food security dimensions. A key diﬀerence of the TUP program from cash or food transfer
programs is this focus on occupational change. The fact that the program has proven to be eﬀective
in reducing poverty through occupational change in diﬀerent contexts makes us more conﬁdent
that this type of program can be successfully implemented in contexts other than Bangladesh and
by organizations other than BRAC.34
In Panel B of Table VI we compare non-economic impacts of the program across studies.
Physical health, covering ability to perform physical tasks, work interruptions due to ill-health and
self-perception of physical health, is signiﬁcantly improved by the program (Column 8). Mental
health, captured by a happiness perception measure and measures of experiencing anxiety and
worry, is also improved (Column 9), and in Column 10 we see that the program enhances political
awareness, captured by political activity or awareness of political representatives at diﬀerent levels
of government. Women also exert greater inﬂuence over household decisions after they become
beneﬁciaries of the program (Column 11)). Across contexts, the program thus seems to have
33Our estimated treatment eﬀects are generally larger than those in Banerjee et al. (2015a). This is likely driven
by the fact that the latter are an average across sites, some of which had small or zero treatment eﬀects. Our
estimated eﬀects are similar in magnitude to Banerjee et al. (2015a)’s estimates for West Bengal, which is the most
similar setting to ours.
34Despite being given a choice, livestock was the main asset taken up in all six pilots, as was the case in
Bangladesh. The type of livestock, however, varied strongly – sheep, goats and oxen in Ethiopia, goats and hens in
Ghana, chickens and pigs in Honduras, goats and cows in India, goats in Pakistan, guinea pigs and hens in Peru.
27
far reaching eﬀects on physical and mental health, political empowerment and empowerment
within the household for ultra-poor women. Economic and social empowerment are both key
objectives of the program and may reinforce one another. Duﬂo (2012), for example, hypothesizes
that improved mental health may (partly) be what gave ultra-poor women in the India pilot the
energy to work more, save and invest in their children. Looking at these links and interactions to
better understand the mechanisms behind the Table VI results represents a fertile area for future
research.
V.General Equilibrium and Distributional Effects
The magnitude of the asset and skills transfers, and the fact that treated ultra-poor households
comprise, on average, 6% of the village population imply that the program might also aﬀect
economic outcomes for households in other wealth classes through general equilibrium eﬀects and
other spillovers. In Section V.A we provide evidence on these indirect eﬀects which could be
negative or positive. For instance, the new engagement in livestock rearing activities started by
the ultra-poor could compete away the ﬁnancial returns to non-poor women already engaged in
these activities. Alternatively, the additional income generated by the ultra-poor could allow them
to increase ﬁnancial intermediation, thus developing village credit markets to the beneﬁt of all.
Our partial population experiment also allows us to quantify distributional eﬀects and, in Section
V.B, we focus on the extent to which the program enables the ultra-poor to close the gap with
the near-poor.
V.A Indirect Treatment Eﬀects on Ineligible Households
To estimate the indirect treatment eﬀect on ineligible households we can simply estimate the
same diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation (1) on the sample of ineligibles (Angelucci and De Giorgi
2009). To estimate the indirect treatment eﬀect (ITE) on each wealth class of ineligible households
we further interact treatment and survey waves indicators with class indicators:
yidt =
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where Cci are dummies that take value 1 if i belongs to class c (near poor, middle and upper class)
and all other variables are as deﬁned previously. We thus evaluate the eﬀect of the program on
the ineligibles by comparing the change in their outcomes in treated villages to the change in their
outcomes in control villages. To benchmark the magnitude of the eﬀects we report the four year
eﬀects in percentage of the control mean for the same wealth class in the same period.
As the primary objective of the program is to induce occupational change of ultra-poor women
by enabling them to shift their labor supply towards livestock rearing, Table VII ﬁrst examines
general equilibrium impacts on the livestock businesses of ineligible women. Panel A shows indirect
treatment eﬀects pooling all ineligible households, and Panel B breaks these out by wealth group.
In Columns 1 and 2 we see that the program has no signiﬁcant impact on the value of cows or
goats held by ineligible households, and Column 3 shows that annual hours devoted by ineligible
women to livestock rearing are also unaﬀected. The point estimates are small both relative to the
eﬀects on the ultrapoor and relative to ineligible households in control villages.35 This is prima
facie evidence that the entry of ultra-poor women into this work activity does not crowd out richer
women who were the main participants in these markets at baseline. In line with this, village level
regressions on the price of milk and the transaction value of cows show no signiﬁcant reductions.
Part of the explanation for these muted general equilibrium eﬀects is that the cows transferred
to the ultra-poor through the program only constitute 7% of the baseline village level stock of
cows. So although the gains in cow holdings brought about by the program are highly signiﬁcant
for the ultra-poor, they only have modest eﬀects on the total number of village cows as the herds
of wealthier women are much larger. Markets where livestock and livestock products are sold tend
to cover a larger area than the area of operations of a BRAC oﬃce with sub-district and regional
markets being particularly important in the Bangladesh context. Also important is the fact that
the livestock transferred to the ultra-poor are procured in regional markets (and not from livestock
owners within villages).
Although ultra-poor women have limited involvement in livestock rearing at baseline they are
35It should be noted that the standard errors are large, suggesting that eﬀects are heterogeneous. This notwith-
standing, even the largest eﬀect we cannot reject is orders of magnitudes smaller than the eﬀect on the ultra-poor.
For instance, the program increases the value of cows by 540 for the ultrapoor while the largest decrease we cannot
rule out on the ineligibles is 56.
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heavily involved in casual wage labor activities, accounting for 47% (58%) of the aggregate hours
supplied in agricultural labor (maid services). The changes in labor allocation of the beneﬁciaries
residing in treatment villages might therefore have general equilibrium eﬀects on ineligible house-
holds in the village, and these might diﬀer by wealth class. In Columns 4 and 5 of Panel A in
Table VII, we see that agricultural labor and maid wages for ineligible women rise signiﬁcantly
as a result of the program. This result was already observed for ultra-poor women in Table III
as a result of them signiﬁcantly reducing their casual labor supply. What Table VII illustrates is
that ineligible women who continue to work in these labor activities also beneﬁt from these wages
increases.
When we break out the results by wealth class in Columns 4 and 5 of Panel B we see that
upper class households do not participate in casual wage labor and that eﬀects are similar across
other ineligible wealth classes, consistent with the fact that these are unskilled activities where the
return does not vary much across individuals. In Columns 6 and 7 we see that ineligible women
respond to the wage increase by reducing hours worked, although none of the eﬀects are precisely
estimated. Given the muted responses of labor supply across the three main female work activities
practised in these village economies it is not surprising that the yearly earnings of ineligible women
are unaﬀected by the program (Column 8).
In Table VIII we estimate indirect treatment eﬀects to gauge if there are spillovers of the
program on the expenditures and asset accumulation of ineligible households. Columns 1 and
2 show no changes in poverty rates or consumption expenditure per equivalent adult. This is
true for ineligible households taken as a whole (Panel A) and when we break out by wealth class
(Panel B). All coeﬃcients are small and precisely estimated. This is a key result as it shows that
ineligible households are not being made worse or better oﬀ by the program. In Figure A.IA in
the Appendix we graph out the four year quantile treatment eﬀects on consumption for ineligible
households. Unlike Figure IIA, which shows large positive eﬀects for eligibles, this ﬁgure is ﬂat
and lies along the zero line for the entire consumption distribution.
Column 3 of Table VIII shows that there is no spillover eﬀect of the program on the value of
household assets held by ineligible households taken together (Panel A) but we do see a positive
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eﬀect that is signiﬁcant at the 10% level for middle class households when we break out by wealth
class (Panel B). In Figure A.IB we see some limited evidence of an eﬀect in higher quantiles
but this is very muted. Columns 4-6 of Table VIII show no signiﬁcant changes in the value of
savings for ineligibles, nor in the probability that these households give or receive a loan. Though
imprecisely estimated there is some suggestion that middle and upper class households are less
likely to give loans after the program.
Land is an important asset to examine as it is a ﬁxed resource in the village. Column 7 shows
that although it is not precisely estimated there is evidence that ineligibles are losing land as
whole (Panel A) and this is almost entirely coming from upper class households (Panel B). The
magnitude of the gain in value of land for ultra-poor households (Table V) is similar to the loss
for upper class households (Table VIII). This provides suggestive evidence that land is transferred
from the richest to the poorest in these villages but what are relatively large gains for the ultra-poor
are relatively small losses for the upper classes.
Finally, Column 8 shows that the value of other business assets (livestock sheds, rickshaws,
vans, pumps etc.) signiﬁcantly increases overall (Panel A) and for the near-poor and middle class
wealth classes (Panel B). The eﬀect represents a 23% increase overall and a 34%, 34% and 6%
increase for near poor, middle and upper class households respectively. This could be due to the
ultra-poor channeling some of their newly accumulated resources to others in the village or to
other households reducing support to the ultra-poor. These ﬁndings are consistent with earlier
studies that have shown causal links between savings behavior of the poor and improved outcomes
for the non-poor through greater ﬁnancial intermediation (Angelucci and De Giorgi 2009; Dupas
et al. 2015).36 However, the value of these business assets is low relative to the value of livestock
and land (see Table I), thus the indirect treatment eﬀect on total productive assets is negligible.
Figure A.ID, which plots quantile treatment eﬀects for the combined value of all productive assets
(livestock, land and other productive assets), shows that, although there is evidence of asset
36Dupas et al. (2015) estimate how access to bank accounts impacts household’s ﬁnancial engagement, where
they vary the spouse within the household to whom the bank account is assigned. The spillover eﬀects are estimated
through how treated households report changes in transfers they send and receive from others. While this and
other papers have used ﬁeld experiments to estimate spillover and general equilibrium impacts our data also allows
us to compare changes in outcomes for ultra-poor households relative to near poor households as is discussed in
the next Subsection.
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accumulation in upper quantiles, none of these eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant.
V.B Distributional Eﬀects
Table I documented that, at baseline, the near-poor were better oﬀ than ultra-poor households.
The partial population experiment allows us to compare how the lives of ultra-poor households
have changed relative to the near-poor after four years. To do so we estimate a triple diﬀerence
speciﬁcation between baseline and year four, treatment and control villages, and ultra-poor and
near-poor households. All outcomes are divided by the average diﬀerence between ultra-poor and
near-poor in treatment villages at baseline, thus an estimated triple diﬀerence  equal to one
indicates that the gap has entirely closed between the two groups. We estimate:
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whereNi equals 1 if i belongs to the near poor class and all other variables are as deﬁned previously.
The results from this exercise are shown in Figure III. The ﬁrst bar in the ﬁgure indicates that
by four years post-intervention, ultra-poor households have closed the (small) gap with near-poor
households in terms of consumption expenditure. More remarkably, the same is true for the value
of household assets, as shown in the second bar, despite the value of household assets held by the
ultra-poor being half of that held by the near-poor at baseline. When we examine savings in the
third bar we see that ﬁnancial savings held by ultra-poor households are four times those held by
near-poor households, from a baseline ratio of 1/3. This is a striking result as this eﬀect is measured
four years after the program ﬁrst starts, and so two years after BRAC’s direct involvement and
when there is no encouragement to hold savings. The result for productive assets in the ﬁnal bar
in Figure III is also striking as we see that ultra-poor households now hold twice the value of
productive assets held by the near-poor, including in areas that are not covered by the program
such as land and business assets.
This set of ﬁndings suggest the program has signiﬁcant distributional impacts between the
ultra-poor and near-poor, and that on many dimensions the ultra-poor can be classiﬁed as ﬁrmly
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entrenched within or above the near-poor wealth class, four years after the program began.
VI.Cost-Benefit Analysis
Table IX makes use of the estimated program impacts to gauge the magnitude of the beneﬁts
relative to the program costs and to estimate its internal rate of return (IRR). The average cost
per treated household for the two year program is USD 1120 in 2007 PPP terms. We initially set
the social discount rate at 5% in line with World Bank guidelines and report sensitivity analysis
to alternative rates.
Since the ultimate goal of the program is to reduce poverty, we follow Banerjee et al. (2015a)
and use changes in household consumption as our core measure of beneﬁts. These include yearly
changes in consumption expenditure and a one-oﬀ change in household assets as measured in year
four. The underlying assumption is that the eﬀect of increased ﬁnancial and productive assets is
fully incorporated in consumption changes. To the extent that asset accumulation as of year four
will lead to even greater increases in consumption in the future we will underestimate the beneﬁts
of the program. Moreover, we make no attempt to price the utility gains to the ultra-poor arising
from a smoother allocation of labor hours across days of the year (as was shown in Table III).37
Rows 1-4 in Table IX report ITT estimates of the program on consumption, for every year after
the intervention up to year four. The year two and four eﬀects are estimated from our midline
and end-line surveys, respectively, while the one- and three-year eﬀects are imputed using linear
interpolation. Row 5 reports the net present value of future consumption changes from year 5
onward, assuming that year four changes are repeated for twenty years from the transfer date (so
16 more years after year 4). Our choice of time horizon is dictated by three facts: (i) the average
beneﬁciary was forty years old when she received the asset in 2007, (ii) women in these villages
work the same number of hours at 60 and older as they do at 40, (iii) the female life expectancy
at birth is 71 today. As these women were born when life expectancy was lower and they live
in the poorest areas of the country, we assume they will be able to continue working with the
37We focus on the beneﬁts accruing to the ultra-poor alone as the program had no eﬀect on the consumption
of ineligible households (Table VIII, Column 2). Table VIII however shows that after four years the program
increases the business asset holdings of ineligible households. We therefore underestimate the beneﬁts accruing to
these households to the extent that this will allow them to increase future consumption.
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assets until they are 60, so 20 years from the transfer date. Below we present sensitivity analysis
to shorter time horizons. In every case we assume that the beneﬁts cease with the death of the
original beneﬁciaries, which is a lower bound if other family members inherit the asset or continue
to beneﬁt from it after the death of the beneﬁciary.38 Row 6 reports the year four change in the
value of household assets (i.e. durables) and Row 7 adds these up to compute the net present
value of beneﬁts. This is divided by the program cost to obtain the beneﬁt/cost ratio in Row 8.
The estimates show that the average beneﬁts of the program are 3.21 times larger than its
cost.39 Table A.VII in the Appendix uses our quantile treatment eﬀects to compute the ratio at
diﬀerent quantiles – it shows that the ratio is above 1 throughout. Row 8 of Table IX investigates
sensitivity to diﬀerent values of the discount rate and diﬀerent time horizons. The ratio of average
beneﬁts to costs remains above one in all cases except if we assume that beneﬁts disappear the
year after our endline, in which case the ratio falls below the break-even point for the average
ultra-poor household. If beneﬁts last two years after endline, that is six years after transfer, the
beneﬁt to cost ratio is 1.06.
Row 9 shows the IRR under alternative assumptions about outside options and time horizons.
The average internal rate of return in our baseline speciﬁcation is 22% and it is positive and clearly
above the discount rate; it goes to zero only when we assume that beneﬁts disappear altogether one
year after our endline (ﬁve years after the transfer).40 While these calculations take into account
that beneﬁciaries substitute away from casual wage labor and hence lose some earnings from that
activity (see Table III), they do not take into account that beneﬁciaries work 206 more hours
and 61 more days over the course of a year. The value of this time depends on its opportunity
cost. We consider two scenarios: (i) assuming aggregate demand constraints for wage labor bind
so there is zero opportunity cost of spending additional hours in livestock rearing; (ii) assuming
unconstrained demand in casual wage labor and so the lost hourly wage is USD 0:34 per hour,
that for agricultural wage labor (which is higher than for causal maid work, as Table I shows).
This is likely to be an upper bound as recent micro studies suggest the true opportunity cost of
38For instance, Roy et al. (2015) show that men belonging to the households of the treated women beneﬁted
indirectly by being able to purchase productive assets from the women’s additional earnings.
39Using the same methods, Banerjee at al. (2015a) report an average beneﬁt/cost ratio of 1:59 for the six pilots.
40This is also above the average internal rate of return of 12% reported in Banerjee et al. (2015a).
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labor is likely below the prevailing wage rate (Foster and Rosenzweig 2010; Kaur 2015).41 The
ﬁnal row of Panel B in Table IX reports lower bounds for the IRR under the latter assumption
as we deduct the value of 206 hours at USD 0:34 per hour from estimated consumption beneﬁts.
With this adjustment the IRR falls from 22% to 16% but it remains positive and larger than the
social discount rate of 5%.
Finally, Panel C of Table IX measures program beneﬁts in terms of productive asset accu-
mulation (livestock, land, agricultural equipment and other machinery used for production) and
ﬁnancial assets (savings plus net lending). Row 12 shows that four years after the asset transfers,
the average household has further accumulated productive assets valued at almost twice as much
as the original transfer. Financial assets are included in this calculation but they account for less
that 10% of the total. The high rates of asset accumulation suggest that future consumption gains
might be sustainable. The next section uses descriptive data from seven year follow-up on the
same households to provide indicative evidence on this issue.
VII.The Ultra-Poor in the Long-Run
To assess whether the one-oﬀ asset and skills transfers provided by the program set the ultra-
poor on a long-run trajectory out of poverty, we ﬁelded a survey to the same ultra-poor households
in 2014, seven years after the program’s implementation. We were able to trace 93% of the
households. As described above, the evaluation design was such that the program would be
oﬀered in control villages starting in 2011 (i.e. after the year four follow-up survey). By 2014,
every control BRAC branch oﬃce had treated some villages within its radius. To choose which
villages and which individuals to treat, BRAC program oﬃcers followed the same process as in
2007, namely they made a list of all villages in the branch ranked from poorest (i.e. with the
largest number of poor households) to least poor, and then implemented a participatory rural
appraisal (PRA) to identify the beneﬁciaries in each village starting from the poorest villages and
stopping when they reached their target number of beneﬁciaries.
41Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) use data from rural India to document that various market imperfections such as
supervision costs, credit market imperfections and scale economies lead to a surplus of labor on small farms: they
quantify that 20% of the Indian agricultural labor force is surplus to requirement. Kaur (2015) ﬁnds that casual
wage labor markets in rural India are well characterized by downward nominal wage rigidity (that are driven by
fairness concerns of employers).
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In practice this implies that 49% of the villages originally assigned to control have at least one
woman treated and 20% of the originally selected beneﬁciaries plus 10% of the original “near poor”
were treated. In 2014 we thus have three groups: the early treated (in 2007), the late treated (in
2011) and the untreated controls. The challenge in identifying the eﬀect of the program in 2014
is that the selection of the late treated is correlated to the outcome of interest: poverty. Indeed,
given BRAC’s targeting strategy, the late treated have lower consumption expenditures, durables
and other assets than those left untreated in 2011.
To provide evidence on the long run impact of the program we follow two strategies. The ﬁrst
simply extends speciﬁcation (1) to include the 2014 survey wave and all control villages/individuals
regardless of whether they are late treated or not. We note that to the extent that the program
has some eﬀect on the late treated after three years, this strategy yields a lower bound on the
actual eﬀect because 1/5 of the control group is actually treated. The second strategy requires
making assumptions about the size of the eﬀect on the late treated. To this purpose we exploit
the QTE estimates on the original treated to create counterfactuals of the eﬀect of the program on
the late treated. Since by 2014 these have been treated for three years, we interpolate between our
two- and four-year estimates of the ITT on the originally treated group to derive a counterfactual
eﬀect for the treated controls in 2014. Table X reports three diﬀerence in diﬀerence estimates
derived by assuming that the eﬀect on the late treated is equal to the median, 75th percentile and
25th percentile treatment eﬀect on the early treated. Throughout we focus on the outcomes used
in the cost-beneﬁt analysis above: household consumption expenditures, household assets, savings
and productive assets.
Table X reports diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates at each survey wave (2009, 2011, 2014) us-
ing the two strategies above. As for the earlier estimates, Table A.VIII reports the equivalent
ANCOVA speciﬁcations. The results are consistent across outcomes and speciﬁcations: the seven
year eﬀects are positive and precisely estimated. Moreover we never reject the null that the seven
year eﬀects on consumption are equal to the four year eﬀects, thus reinforcing the conclusions of
the cost beneﬁt analysis. The only eﬀect that is systematically smaller after seven years is that
on savings, which falls by about 50%, depending on the speciﬁcation. Further analysis shows
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that this is coupled with an increase in land access through purchases, which are captured in the
value of productive assets, and especially rentals, which are not. The most conservative estimate
suggests that average quantity of land rented increase by 3.5 decimals after four years and by 4.4
decimals after seven. Given that agricultural land is a key asset in the villages we study and is
also the asset which most clearly diﬀerentiates poor from non-poor households, this is a striking
change.
Overall, while these seven year results must be interpreted with caution as the responses of the
original beneﬁciaries might be an imperfect counterfactual for the responses of the late treated
controls, a major diﬀerence would be needed to reverse the conclusion that a one-oﬀ transfer of
assets and skills allows the ultra-poor to escape poverty in a sustainable way.
VIII.Conclusions
The question of how to eliminate extreme poverty by 2030 has now risen to the top of the
development policy agenda and there is a growing realization that the poorest may be being
bypassed both by economic growth and by current anti-poverty programs.42 Our results suggest
the labor activities the poor can access and their ability to exit poverty are intrinsically linked.
The women we study possess no means of production other than their labor and lie at the bottom
rung of the employment ladder in rural villages, facing low returns to and irregular demand for
their labor. They live predominantly in the monga or famine areas of Bangladesh and in the work
they do they are not very diﬀerent from the majority of Indian famine victims in the 19th and
20th centuries (Dreze 1988).
We ﬁnd that the TUP program enables these ultra-poor women to take on the labor market
activities of better oﬀ women in the same villages as they dramatically expand overall labor supply,
principally by working more hours in livestock rearing. As their labor supply expands and their
employment becomes more regular, they experience a 21% increase in earnings which allows them
to accumulate further productive and assets and set oﬀ on a sustainable trajectory out of poverty.
Our evidence demonstrates that enabling the poor to allocate their labor to the activities chosen
by richer women in their villages may have a central role to play in eliminating extreme poverty.
42This was part of a longer set of Sustainable Development Goals agreed in 2015.
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However, given the TUP program has multiple components bundled together, we understand little
so far about which elements are critical to unleashing this process of change. Getting a better
sense of this is therefore a key priority. Understanding why we observe heterogeneity in program
returns is also critical for gaining a better understanding of the determinants of poverty.
After four years we ﬁnd that the program was highly cost-eﬀective with an IRR of 22%, and
that a sizable fraction of ultra-poor households would have enjoyed positive returns had they been
able to ﬁnance these investments from either the formal or microﬁnance sectors. Given these
ﬁndings it would also seem worthwhile exploring versions of the program where households have
to repay some fraction of the cost of the asset transfer as a means of reducing program costs.
What is also important is to understand how diﬀerent ways of ﬁnancing the program aﬀect
the cost beneﬁt analysis. Buera et al. (2014) study the scale-up properties of TUP-style pro-
grams using a quantitative general equilibrium model of occupational choice with credit market
imperfections to simulate the aggregate impacts of a one-time redistribution (not transfer from
outside) of assets (ignoring skill transfers). Their simulations generate muted long run impacts
because they ﬁnd only the top quartile most productive individuals transition to capital intensive
activities. This does not match our micro evidence where the TUP program appears well targeted
so the share of ultra-poor engaged in livestock rearing rises by 48pp four years post transfer. More
work needs to be done to bring together these macro and micro approaches, including develop-
ing models that incorporate the skills transfer component of the program and model transfers as
coming from outside the village.
A key diﬀerence of the TUP program from most cash or food transfer programs is that it is
a one-oﬀ, big push intervention. Though big push programs require large up-front investment,
our evidence suggests they are cost-eﬀective and lead to sustained increases in household welfare.
Indeed, the observed pattern of asset accumulation between years two, four and seven indicates
that, although the cost of the two year program is ﬁxed, the beneﬁts grow in the short term and
stabilize in the medium term. This may be a key advantage relative to cash and food transfer
programs which do not encourage occupational change, where annual costs are lower but need
to be recurrent in order to exert an inﬂuence on consumption (see also Blattman et al. 2014;
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Banerjee et al. 2015a, Banerjee 2016).43
Understanding whether and how governments can take up these programs and whether they
can be adapted to urban settings are all unknowns that will have a critical bearing on whether this
idea spreads and scales. The juxtaposition of the goal of eliminating extreme poverty by 2030 and
the promising set of initial results in this and related papers does, however, suggest that taking
up these research challenges would be a worthwhile endeavor.
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Table I: Household Characteristics and Asset Holdings, by Wealth Class
(1) Ultra-Poor
(2) Near-
Poor
(3) Middle
Class
(4) Upper
Class
Household Characteristics
Share of population in this wealth class .061 .219 .585 .135
Primary female is the sole earner .409 .250 .142 .120
Primary female is illiterate .929 .832 .736 .489
Consumption and Assets
Household is below the $1.25 a day poverty line .530 .493 .373 .121
Consumption Expenditure (per adult equivalent) 627.8 645.1 759.5 1234.2
Household assets [USD] 36.5 68.1 279.9 1663.4
Household savings [USD] 7.9 22.1 84.5 481.9
Household receives loans .191 .393 .498 .433
Household gives loans .012 .018 .030 .067
Business assets (excl. livestock and land) [USD] 22.9 54.4 286.1 1569.8
Livestock
Household owns cows .055 .154 .469 .733
Household owns goats .092 .142 .300 .425
Value of cows [USD] 33.8 120.2 633.8 1559.1
Value of goats [USD] 7.97 12.8 39.8 71.3
Household rents cows for rearing .070 .148 .118 .030
Household rents goats for rearing .111 .157 .102 .021
Land
Household owns land .066 .107 .487 .911
Value of land owned [USD] 200.0 491.2 6789.6 40125.1
Household rents land for cultivation .060 .143 .276 .168
Number of sample households 6732 6743 6328 2036
Notes: All statistics are constructed using baseline household data from both treatment and control villages. Wealth classes are based on the
participatory rural assessment (PRA) exercise: the ultra-poor are ranked in the bottom wealth bins (4th if 4 bins are used, 5th if 5 are used) and
meet the program eligibility criteria, the near-poor are ranked in the bottom wealth bins and do not meet the program eligibility criteria, the
middle class are ranked in the middle wealth bins (2nd and 3rd if 4 are used, 2nd, 3rd and 4th if 5 are used) and the upper classes are those
ranked in the top bin. The number of sample households in each wealth class at baseline is reported at the foot of the table. The poverty line
threshold used is $1.25 per person per day. Consumption expenditure is defined as total household expenditure over the previous year divided
by adult equivalents in the household. The adult equivalence scale gives weight .5 to each child younger than 10. The expenditure items
covered are: food (both purchased and produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles,
dowries, education, charity and legal expenses. Household assets include jewelry, sarees, radio, television, mobile phones, furniture, etc.
Household savings refer to value of savings held at home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards. Loans are from both formal and
informal sources. Business assets include pumps, livestock sheds, trees, rickshaws and others. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD
terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Means, standard deviation in parentheses
(1) Ultra-Poor (2) Near-Poor (3) Middle Class (4) Upper Class
Engaged in any income generating activity .843 .810 .863 .903
Total hours worked in the past year 991 769 553 502
(894) (812) (596) (502)
Total days worked in the past year 252 265 302 325
(137) (142) (123) (103)
Casual Wage Labor:
Hours devoted to agricultural labor 258 196 47.7 3.05
(533) (467) (236) (49.9)
Hours devoted to domestic maid 388 193 41.9 .648
(708) (516) (251) (22.7)
Capital-intensive activities:
Hours devoted to livestock rearing (cows/goats) 121 221 366 404
(265) (341) (390) (370)
Number of sample households 6732 6743 6328 2036
Notes: All statistics are constructed using baseline household data from both treatment and control villages. Wealth classes are based on the participatory rural assessment (PRA)
exercise: the ultra-poor are ranked in the bottom wealth bins (4th if 4 bins are used, 5th if 5 are used) and meet the program eligibility criteria, the near-poor are ranked in the
bottom wealth bins and do not meet the program eligibility criteria, the middle class are ranked in the middle wealth bins (2nd and 3rd if 4 are used, 2nd, 3rd and 4th if 5 are used)
and the upper classes are those ranked in the top bin. The number of households in each wealth class at baseline is reported at the foot of the table. Engagement in any income
generating activity covers all potential activities.
Table II: Labor Market Activities of Women, By Wealth Class
Sample: Ultra Poor Women
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
Panel A: Labor Supply
(1) Hours (2) Days (3) Hours (4) Days (5) Hours (6) Days (7) Hours (8) Days
Program impact after 2 years 488*** 205.5*** -42.3 -3.54 -57.4 -8.45 341*** 72.4***
(30.7) (11.1) (53.0) (7.02) (42.9) (5.88) (67.9) (10.0)
Program impact after 4 years 415*** 171.6*** -46.2 -4.77 -117** -16.77*** 206*** 61.1***
(38.9) (10.9) (42.7) (5.43) (45.0) (5.82) (73.0) (12.5)
Control mean at four year follow-up 191.00 94.76 278.14 35.40 447.05 63.97 1217.00 277.40
Four year impact: % change 217% 181% -17% -13.5% -26% -26% 17% 22%
Two year impact = Four year impact [p-value] .111 .023 .930 .831 .125 .125 .080 .179
Adjusted R-squared .335 .367 .184 .183 .067 .061 .072 .069
Number of ultra-poor women 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732
Number of observations (clusters) 20196 (40) 20196 (40) 20196 (40) 20196 (40) 20196 (40) 20196 (40) 20196 (40) 20196 (40)
Panel B: Earnings Livestock All Activities
(9) Earnings (10) Wage (11) Earnings (12) Wage (13) Earnings (14) Earnings
Program impact after 2 years 80*** .028 -9.99 .034 -11.48 62.3**
(14.0) (.021) (13.98) (.022) (11.36) (30.17)
Program impact after 4 years 115*** .053** -3.89 .074*** -25.25** 87.8***
(14.1) (.024) (13.97) (.019) (11.57) (28.58)
Control mean at four year follow-up 18.48 .441 96.44 .354 112.84 410.92
Four year impact: % change 16% 12% -4% 21% -22% 21%
Two year impact = Four year impact [p-value] .049 .219 .701 .080 .205 .455
Adjusted R-squared .127 .486 0.178 .241 .095 0.088
Number of ultra-poor women 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732
Number of observations (clusters) 20120 (40) 5227 (40) 19883 (40) 5833 (40) 19796 (40) 20135 (40)
Table III: Treatment Effects on the Labor Supply and Earnings of Ultra-Poor Women
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Intent-to-treat estimates are reported based on a difference-in-difference specification estimated using OLS. This regresses the outcome of interest for
woman i in village v in survey wave t on a constant, a dummy for whether the woman resides in a treated village, dummies for the two follow-up survey waves (two and four years post-intervention), the interaction between
the treatment assignment dummy and each survey wave dummy, and a set of strata (sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are those on the treatment-survey wave interaction terms. Standard errors are
clustered by BRAC branch area. All outcomes are measured at the individual level (for the ultra-poor woman in the household), and defined for the year prior to survey date. We report the mean of each dependent variable
as measured at baseline in treated villages. In all Columns we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the two and four year ITT impacts are equal. The number of ultra-poor is the number of eligible women that are
observed at baseline and in both follow-up survey waves. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Livestock Agriculture Maid All Activities
Agriculture Maid
DiD ITT Estimates: Household Level Outcomes
Sample: Ultra Poor Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
(1) Below Poverty
Line
(2) Consumption
Expenditure (per
adult equivalent)
(3) Value of
Household Assets
(4) Household
Cash Savings
(5) Household
Receives Loans
(6) Household
Gives Loans
Program impact after 2 years -.051 30.19 6.86 54.54*** .123*** .042***
(.046) (25.34) (7.26) (4.60) (0.03) (0.01)
Program impact after 4 years -.084** 62.62*** 39.65*** 53.22*** .110*** .051***
(.038) (20.82) (9.08) (4.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Control mean at four year follow-up .624 575.73 69.69 425% .220 .016
Four year impact: % change -13.5% 11% 57% 24% 50% 319%
Two year impact = Four year impact [p-value] .379 .111 .000 .781 .714 .527
Adjusted R-squared .032 .044 .082 .204 .086 .026
Number of ultra-poor women 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732
Observations (clusters) 18882(40) 18838 (40) 20196 (40) 20179 (40) 20196 (40) 20196 (40)
Poverty and Consumption Financial Assets
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates are reported based on a difference-in-difference specification estimated using OLS. All outcomes are measured at the
household level, using data on ultra poor households with an eligible woman resident in them at baseline. This regresses the outcome of interest for household h in village v in survey wave t on a constant, a dummy for
whether the household resides in a treated village, dummies for the two follow-up survey waves (two and four years post-intervention), the interaction between the treatment assignment dummy and each survey wave
dummy, and a set of strata (sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are those on the treatment-survey wave interaction terms. Standard errors are clustered by BRAC branch area. In Column 1, the poverty line
threshold used is $1.25 per person per day, as measured in 2007 prices. In Column 2, consumption expenditure is defined as total household expenditure over the previous year divided by adult equivalents in the
household. The adult equivalence scale gives weight .5 to each child younger than 10. The expenditure items covered are: food (both purchased and produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities,
clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles, dowries, education, charity and legal expenses. In Column 3, household assets include jewelry, sarees, radio, television, mobile phones, furniture, etc. In Column 4, household cash
savings refer to value of savings held at home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards. We report the mean of each dependent variable as measured at baseline in treated villages. In all Columns we report the p-
value on the null hypothesis that the two and four year ITT impacts are equal. The number of ultra-poor is the number of eligible women that are observed at baseline and in both follow-up survey waves. All monetary
amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Table IV: Treatment Effects on Consumption, Household and Financial Assets of Ultra-Poor Households
DiD ITT Estimates: Household Level Outcomes
Sample: Ultra Poor Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
(1) Value of
Cows
(2) Value of
Goats
(3) Rents
Land
(4) Owns
Land
(5) Value of
Land owned
(6) Value of Other
Business Assets
Program impact after 2 years 484.65*** 28.11*** .069*** .005 39.80 23.84***
(19.46) (3.77) (.020) (.011) (75.23) (6.85)
Program impact after 4 years 539.66*** 20.57*** .110*** .026* 326.98** 64.76***
(45.16) (4.12) (.022) (.012) (131.27) (11.91)
Control mean at four year follow-up 61.89 9.26 .079 .058 400.61 40.72
Mean value of asset transfer from program 464.03 39.9 - - - -
Four year impact: % change (net of transfer if positive) 122% -208% 139% 45% 82% 159%
Two year impact = Four year impact [p-value] .148 .004 .054 .005 .002 .000
Adjusted R-squared 0.390 0.109 .077 .034 0.019 0.066
Number of ultra-poor women 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732 6732
Observations (clusters) 20182 (40) 20072 (40) 20196 (40) 20196 (40) 20195 (40) 20195 (40)
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates are reported based on a difference-in-difference specification estimated using OLS. All
outcomes are measured at the household level, using data on ultra poor households with an eligible women resident in them at baseline. This regresses the outcome of interest for household h
in village v in survey wave t on a constant, a dummy for whether the household resides in a treated village, dummies for the two follow-up survey waves (two and four years post-intervention),
the interaction between the treatment assignment dummy and each survey wave dummy, and a set of strata (sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are those on the treatment-
survey wave interaction terms. Standard errors are clustered by BRAC branch area. In Column 6, business assets include pumps, livestock sheds, trees, rickshaws and others. We report the
mean of each dependent variable as measured at baseline in treated villages. In all Columns we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the two and four year ITT impacts are equal. The
number of ultra-poor is the number of eligible women that are observed at baseline and in both follow-up survey waves. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices
and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Table V: Treatment Effects on Productive Assets Held by Ultra-Poor Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
Panel A
(1) Total per capita
consumption,
standardized
(2) Food
security index
(3) Asset
index
(4) Financial
inclusion index
(5) Total time spent
working by main
woman,
standardized
(6) Total time spent
working by both
respondents
pooled,
standardized
(7) Incomes and
revenues index
Treatment effect - four year endline 0.314*** 0.256*** 0.327*** 0.313*** 0.122* 0.065 0.627***
(0.034) (0.079) (0.029) (0.040) (0.065) (0.047) (0.074)
0.120*** 0.113*** 0.249*** 0.212*** 0.054*** 0.273***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.018) (0.029)
Panel B
(8) Physical health
index
(9) Mental
health index
(10) Political
Awareness
index
(11) Women's
empowerment
index
Treatment effect - four year endline 0.108*** 0.077* 0.269*** 0.077
(0.027) (0.043) (0.091) (0.056)
0.029 0.071*** 0.064*** 0.022
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.025)
Treatment Effect in Banerjee et al
(2015a) - three year endline n/a
Treatment Effect in Banerjee et al
(2015a) - three year endline
Notes: Following Banerjee et al. (2015a), we estimate ITT by regressing endline outcomes on baseline outcomes and randomization strata (sub-districts). We construct indices first by defining each outcome so that
higher values correspond to better outcomes. We then standardize each outcome into a z-score, by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation (SD) at the corresponding
survey round. We then average all of the z-scores, and again standardize to the control group within each round. The variables used for each index are described in detail in the Appendix. All indices but Mental Health
and Political Awareness are directly comparable. Column 1 reports standardized total per capita consumption per month. The food security index in Column 2 is based on survey responses regarding whether the
household had a food surplus or deficit, enough food to eat over the last month and could afford to have two meals per day most of the time during the last year. The asset index in Column 3 is constructed based on the
total value of productive and household assets measured in terms of a numeraire asset and standardized. The financial inclusion index in Column 4 is constructed based on the amount borrowed in the last 12 months
from all sources, informal sources and formal sources, and total savings at the time of the survey. Column 5 reports a standardized measure of the total time the main female household member spent in productive
activities on a typical day during the past year, and Column 6 pools the same measure for both the female respondent and the male household head where applicable. The income and revenues index in Column 7 is
constructed based on monthly household livestock revenue and income from agriculture, non-farm micro-enterprises and paid labor as reported by the main female respondent. The physical health index in Column 8 is
constructed based on respondents' self-reported ability to perform physical tasks, whether any household member had an illness in the 15 days before the survey and whether this interfered with any income-generating
activity, and the respondent's self-perception of her current health. The mental health index in Column 9 is constructed based on self-reported happiness and mental anxiety. The political awareness index in Column 10
is based on whether the respondent can correctly name politicians at different levels and is aware of the lowest legal age for voting. The women's empowerment index in Column 11 is based on women's responses to a
series of questions regarding their influence over household decision-making in several scenarios. Our estimates are based on the sample of 6,732 eligible women used throughout the paper. The second row reports
the endline 2 estimates from Table 3 in Banerjee et al. (2015a), based on a sample that varies from 9,482 to 9,508.
Table VI: Comparison with Pilot Results from Six Countries
Sample: Non-Eligible Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
(1) Value of
Cows
(2) Value of
Goats
(3) Hours
devoted to
livestock rearing
(main woman)
(4) Wage-Maids
(main woman)
(5) Wage-
agriculture
(main woman)
(6) Hours
devoted to maid
jobs (main
woman)
(7) Hours
devoted to
agricultural
wage jobs (main
woman)
(8) Yearly
earnings (main
woman)
Panel A. Pooled
Program impact after 4 years -9.53 0.885 5.28 .044** .043* -16.10 -18.25 -28.75
(23.02) (2.49) (43.89) (.020) (.024) (18.99) (25.47) (31.26)
Four year impact: % change -2% 4% 1% 11% 9% -13% -13% -9%
Adjusted R-squared .029 .050 .044 .208 .460 .021 .113 0.069
Number of observations (clusters) 48212 (40) 48303 (40) 48891 (40) 5055 (40) 6117 (40) 48891 (40) 48891 (40) 48094 (40)
Panel B. By Wealth Class
Program impact on near-poor after 4 years -24.27 1.72 51.97 .040** .046* -24.81 -35.45 -26.77
(21.74) (2.24) (44.60) (0.02) (0.03) (32.72) (45.02) (22.64)
Program impact on middle classes after 4 years 28.16 1.85 -30.41 .052* .020 -20.36 -1.38 -14.16
(30.88) (3.37) (46.01) (0.03) (0.03) (14.22) (12.08) (49.43)
Program impact on upper classes after 4 years -30.03 -1.23 -40.23 - - - - -63.05
(72.65) (6.03) (54.23) - - - - (69.50)
Four year impact on near-poor: % change -16% 14% 18% 10% 9% -13% -14% -8%
Four year impact on middle classes: % change 6% 7% -7% 14% 4% -28% -2% -5%
Four year impact on upper classes: % change -3% -3% -8% - - - - -18%
Adjusted R-squared .213 .094 .089 .207 .462 .063 .150 .081
Number of observations (clusters) 48212 (40) 48303 (40) 48891 (40) 5055 (40) 6117 (40) 48891 (40) 48891 (40) 48094 (40)
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. The sample comprises all ineligible households who are present in the three survey waves. Panel A reports indirect treatment effect (ITE) estimates based on a difference-in-
difference specification estimated using OLS in the whole sample. This regresses the outcome of interest for household h in village v in survey wave t on a constant, a dummy for whether the household resides in a treated village, dummies for the
two follow-up survey waves (two and four years post-intervention), the interaction between the treatment assignment dummy and each survey wave dummy, and a set of strata (sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are those on the
treatment-survey wave interaction terms four years post-intervention. Standard errors are clustered by BRAC branch area. Panel B reports the corresponding coefficients from a specification that allows treatment, survey waves and their
interactions to vary according to social class. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
DiD ITE: Program impact after 4 years
Table VII: Indirect Treatment Effects on Livestock and Casual Labor Markets of Women in Non-Eligible Households
Table VIII: Indirect Treatment Effects on Consumption, Household and Financial Assets of Non-Eligible Households
Sample: Non-Eligible Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
(1) Below
Poverty Line
(2) Consumption
Expenditure (per
adult equivalent)
(3) Value of
Household
Assets
(4) Household
Cash Savings
(5) Household
Receives
Loans
(6) Household
Gives Loans
(7) Value of
Land owned
(8) Value of
Other
Business
Assets
Panel A. Pooled
Program impact after 4 years -.011 -.46 33.22 3.69 -0.002 -.013 626.14 63.55**
(.05) (29.90) (28.60) (6.03) (0.04) (.01) (1182.80) (29.35)
Four year impact: % change -2% -0.1% 8% 8% -0.4% -28% 5% 23%
Adjusted R-squared .041 .038 .017 .007 .055 .029 .024 .018
Number of observations (clusters) 46046 45440 48200 48217 48891 48891 48201 (40) 48201 (40)
Panel B. By Wealth Class
Program impact on near-poor after 4 years -.015 5.31 11.13 2.52 0.007 -.003 -32.18 29.35**
(.04) (24.31) (17.51) (4.05) (0.05) (.01) (282.52) (14.43)
Program impact on middle classes after 4 years -.030 11.17 53.72* 5.54 -0.003 -.024 51.16 97.23***
(.05) (36.57) (31.80) (8.06) (0.04) (.02) (1425.75) (34.01)
Program impact on upper classes after 4 years .011 -27.06 55.03 6.34 -0.054 -.031 -566.68 63.75
(.05) (47.32) (101.20) (21.97) (0.04) (.02) (3775.98) (118.79)
Four year impact on near-poor: % change -3% 1% 8% 11% 2% -9% -3% 34%
Four year impact on middle classes: % change -6% 2% 12% 10% -0.6% -27% 0.3% 34%
Four year impact on upper classes: % change 4% -3% 4% 6% -9% -30% -1% 6%
Adjusted R-squared .100 .156 .304 .066 .079 .046 .366 .204
Number of observations (clusters) 46046 (40) 45440 (40) 48200 (40) 48217 (40) 48891 (40) 48891(40) 48201 (40) 48201 (40)
Poverty and Consumption Financial Assets
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. The sample comprises all ineligible households who are present in the three survey waves. Panel A reports indirect treatment effect (ITE) estimates
based on a difference-in-difference specification estimated using OLS in the whole sample. This regresses the outcome of interest for household h in village v in survey wave t on a constant, a dummy for whether the
household resides in a treated village, dummies for the two follow-up survey waves (two and four years post-intervention), the interaction between the treatment assignment dummy and each survey wave dummy, and a
set of strata (sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are those on the treatment-survey wave interaction terms four years post-intervention. Standard errors are clustered by BRAC branch area. Panel B reports
the corresponding coefficients from a specification that allows treatment, survey waves and their interactions to vary according to social class. In Column 1, the poverty line threshold used is $1.25 per person per day, as
measured in 2007 prices. In Column 2, consumption expenditure is defined as total household consumption expenditure over the previous year divided by adult equivalents in the household. The adult equivalence scale
gives weight .5 to each child younger than 10. The expenditure items covered are: food (both purchased and produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles, dowries,
education, charity and legal expenses. In Column 3, household assets include jewelry, sarees, radio, television, mobile phones, furniture, etc. In Column 4, household cash savings refer to value of savings held at home,
at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards. In Column 8, business assets include pumps, livestock sheds, trees, rickshaws and others. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and
deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Productive Assets
DiD ITE: Program impact after 4 years
Panel A. External parameters
Cost per household at year 0 1121.34
Cost per household discounted at year 4 1363.00
Social discount rate = 5%
Panel B. Estimated Consumption Benefits
1 Change in household consumption expenditure year 1 61
2 Change in household consumption expenditure year 2 106
3 Change in household consumption expenditure year 3 237
4 Change in household consumption expenditure year 4 345
5 NPV Change in household consumption expenditure from year 5 for 20 years 3581
6 Change in household assets year 4 40
7 Total benefits (1+2+3+4+5+6) 4369
8 Benefits/cost ratio (assuming benefits last 20 years from transfer date) 3.21
Sensitivity to different discount rates/time horizons
Social discount rate = 10% 2.50
Benefits last 10 years from transfer date 1.86
Benefits last 5 years from transfer date 0.82
9 IRR (assuming benefits last 20 years from transfer date) 0.22
Sensitivity to different outside options/time horizons
Wage jobs available all year at $.34 per hour 0.16
Benefits last 10 years from transfer date 0.17
Benefits last 5 years from transfer date -0.01
Panel C. Estimated Asset Benefits
10 Change in productive assets year 4 1030.50
11 Change in financial assets year 4 85.10
12 1.85Increase in assets /asset cost
Notes: Household consumption includes: food (both purchased and produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation,
utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles, dowries, education, charity and legal expenses. Productive assets include
livestock, land, agricultural equipment and other machinery used for production. Financial assets equal the value of savings
(held at home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards) plus loans owed to the HH minus loans the HHs owes to others.
The IRR is based on estimated non-durable consumption gains, assuming that these last for the expected productive life of the
beneficiaries, set at 20 years. When we assume that wage jobs are always available at the observed agricultural wage we
deduct the estimated increase in labor supply (206 hours) multiplied by wage the from consumption benefits. All monetary
amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007,
1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Table IX: Cost-Benefit Analysis
DiD ITT Estimates: Household Level Outcomes
Sample: Ultra Poor Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
(1) Household
Consumption Expenditure
(2) Value of
Household Assets
(3) Household Cash
Savings
(4) Value of
Productive Assets
Program impact after 2 years 112.2* 6.860 54.69*** 606.4***
(62.62) (7.262) (4.601) (92.05)
Program impact after 4 years 358.2*** 39.65*** 53.22*** 972.6***
(63.54) (9.075) (4.007) (158.3)
Program impact after 7 years
adjustment for program effect on the late treated:
1. none 281.0** 27.09* 21.43*** 662.0***
(119.6) (13.93) (3.935) (214.4)
2. = median 3Y treatment effect on the early treated 327.2*** 30.36** 31.84*** 782.8***
(119.5) (13.94) (4.054) (214.6)
3. = 75th ptile 3Y treatment effect on the early treated 338.9*** 33.52** 36.34*** 830.9***
(119.6) (13.96) (4.222) (215.0)
4. = 25th ptile 3Y treatment effect on the early treated 315.5** 28.36** 27.90*** 751.1***
(119.5) (13.93) (3.962) (214.5)
P-values:
Four year impact = Seven year impact (row 1) .563 .354 .000 .052
Four year impact = Seven year impact (row 2) .816 .496 .000 .233
Four year impact = Seven year impact (row 3) .749 .409 .000 .374
Four year impact = Seven year impact (row 4) .885 .652 .001 .164
Observations (clusters) 25176 (40) 26437 (40) 26437 (40) 26435 (40)
Table X. Seven-Year Treatment Effects on Consumption, Savings and Assets of Ultra-Poor Households
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates are reported based on a difference-in-difference specification estimated using OLS. All outcomes are measured at the
household level, using data on ultra poor households with an eligible woman resident in them at baseline. We estimate 7 year treatment effects under different assumptions on the effect of the program on the late
treated households in control villages. Row 1 assumes that the program effect on the late treated is zero and includes all control households regardless of whether late treated or not. Rows 2 (3,4) assume that that the
program effect on the late treated is equal to the median (75th, 25th percentile) effect on the early treated at the same point in time. In these rows we adjust the seven year outcomes of the late treated by adding the
estimated treatment effect of the early treated. In all specifications we regress the outcome of interest for household h in village v in survey wave t on a constant, a dummy for whether the household resides in a
treated village, dummies for the three follow-up survey waves (two, four, and seven years post-intervention), the interaction between the treatment assignment dummy and each survey wave dummy, and a set of strata
(sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are those on the treatment-survey wave interaction terms. Standard errors are clustered by BRAC branch area. In Column 1, consumption expenditure is defined as
total household expenditure over the previous year. The expenditure items covered are: food (both purchased and produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles,
dowries, education, charity and legal expenses. In Column 2, household assets include jewelry, sarees, radio, television, mobile phones, furniture, etc. In Column 3, household cash savings refer to value of savings
held at home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards. In Column 4 productive assets include livestock, land and business assets. We report the mean of each dependent variable as measured at baseline in
treated villages. In all Columns we report the p-value on the null hypothesis that the four and seven year ITT impacts are equal. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated
using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Figure I: Features of Rural Labor Markets for Women
C. Hourly Earnings, Average by Branch
A. Share of Hours of Casual Labor and Self-Employment by Branch
Notes: All figures are derived using the baseline household survey and present statistics on the three main occupations: domestic maid (red), agricultural labor (blue), livestock rearing (green), and other (white). Panel A shows the share of
hours devoted to the different occupations by BRAC branch, ordered by the share of hours devoted to casual labor in agriculture. Panel B shows the share of hours devoted to the different labor market activities by wealth class. Panel C shows
the hourly returns to the different occupations by BRAC branch, ordered by returns to livestock rearing. For each activity, earnings per hour are calculated as total earnings from that activity divided by total hours worked in the activity, both
defined over the year prior to the baseline survey for individuals who had positive hours and non-missing earnings in that activity. Panel D graphs local polynomial regressions of the hourly returns to activities by the value of livestock owned. The
vertical lines correspond to the average value of livestock owned by the ultra-poor pre- and post-intervention. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In
2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
B. Share of Hours into Activity, by Wealth Class
D. Local Polynomial Regression of Hourly Earnings on Livestock Value
Livestock Value [USD]
Ultra-Poor's' Average
Livestock Value, Pre-
and Post-intervention.
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Agriculture
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A. Consumption Expenditure (per adult equivalent) B. Value of Household Assets
C. Savings D. Value of Productive Assets
Notes: Quantile treatment effect (QTE) estimates of the differences in outcomes between four-year follow-up and baseline are presented in each panel. Each specification controls for
randomization strata. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (using 500 replications) are based on standard errors clustered by BRAC branch. Consumption expenditure includes: food (both
purchased and produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles, dowries, education, charity and legal expenses. Household assets include
jewelry, sarees, radio, television, mobile phones, furniture, etc. Productive assets include livestock, land, agricultural equipment and other machinery used for production. Savings equal the total
value of savings held at home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by
Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Figure II: Four-Year Quantile Treatment Effects
CentileCentile
CentileCentile
Figure III: Four-Year Treatment Effects on the Gap between Ultra-Poor and Near Poor
Notes: Estimates are based on a triple-difference specification between baseline and year four, treatment and control, eligibles and non eligibles. estimated using OLS with standard errors clustered
at the branch level. All outcomes are divided by the average difference between eligibles and non eligibles in treatment at baseline, thus a measured impacts of one indicates that gap has closed.
Consumption expenditure includes: food (both purchased and produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles, dowries, education, charity and
legal expenses. Household assets include jewelry, sarees, radio, television, mobile phones, furniture, etc. Productive assets include livestock, land, agricultural equipment and other machinery used
for production. Savings equal the total value of savings held at home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and
deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
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ONLINE APPENDIX
1
Construction of Data Set for Comparison with Banerjee et al. (2015a)
The outcomes we replicate are indices corresponding to the ten primary outcome measures studied in Banerjee
et al. (2015a). Each outcome is a composite index that combines outcomes for individual/household i related
to outcome k, denoted Y ki . Following Banerjee et al. (2015a), we construct each index k by first defining every
outcome within the relevant group of outcomes such that higher values correspond to better outcomes. We then
standardize each outcome into a z-score by subtracting the control group mean and dividing by the control group
standard deviation (SD) for the corresponding survey round. We then average all the z-scores and again standardize
to the control group within each round. We convert all monetary values to 2014 USD PPP terms.
Following Banerjee et al. (2015a), we estimate the following specification:
Y ki = α+ β1assignmenti + Z
k
i + Vstrata + εi, (1)
where Y ki is the outcome k of interest for either household or adult i, assignmenti is an indicator for having been
randomly selected into the program, Zki is the household’s baseline value of the outcome variable k, Vstrata is the
vector of all variables included in stratification (i.e. subdistrict fixed effects). Standard errors are clustered at the
branch level (unit of randomization).
The dependent variable in Column 1 of Table 6 is the standardized total per capita consumption per month.
To ensure comparability with Banerjee et al. (2015a), this consumption measure differs from that used in the rest
of the paper in the following ways: (i) expenditures on income-generating activities are excluded; (ii) expenditure
is defined per household member (as opposed to adult-equivalent household member); (iii) monthly expenditure is
used; (iv) monetary values are reported in 2014 USD PPP terms.
The dependent variable in Column 2 is a food security index. To build the food security index, Banerjee et al.
(2015a) use five indicators: (i) everyone gets enough food every day; (ii) no adult skips meals; (iii) no one went a
whole day without food; (iv) no child skipped meals; (v) everyone regularly eats two meals a day. We build the
most comparable indicators we can using our survey instrument. In particular, to build a comparable measure for
(i) we define a variable equal to 1 if the respondent reported that her household’s status in terms of food availability
was “neither deficit nor surplus” or “food surplus” and 0 if she said it was “always deficit” or “deficit sometimes”.
For (iii), we define a variable equal to 1 if the respondent reported that in the month preceding the survey, her
household never had less than enough food to eat and 0 otherwise. Since our survey did not ask this question
separately for adult versus child members, we cannot build indicators for measures (ii) and (iv). Finally, for (v) we
define a dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent reported that her household could afford to have two meals
per day most of the time during the last year and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable in Column 3 is an asset index, based on the total value of productive and household
assets. To ensure comparability with Banerjee et al. (2015a), we construct the measure via the following steps: (i)
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calculate the median unit value for each type of asset; (ii) calculate the value of each asset in terms of goats (the
numeraire asset) by dividing the unit value of each asset by the median unit value of goats; (iii) calculate total
asset value by multiplying the unit value of each asset (expressed in terms of goats) by the number of each asset
owned; (iv) standardize the total asset value.
The dependent variable in Column 4 is a financial inclusion index. Banerjee et al. (2015a) use five indicators to
construct this index: (i) total amount borrowed in the last 12 months; (ii) amount borrowed from informal sources
(neighbor, friend, shopkeeper, family, work place, moneylender, etc.) in the last 12 months; (iii) amount borrowed
from formal sources (MFI, NGO, government) in the last 12 months; (iv) total savings at the time of the survey;
(v) total amount deposited in savings during the last 12 months. We have data on all but the last indicator, so we
use (i)-(iv) to construct the index.
The dependent variable in Column 5 is a standardized measure of the total time spent by the main woman of the
household in productive activities on a typical day during the past year. Banerjee et al. (2015a) measure individual
labor supply as the total minutes spent on all productive activities in the day prior to survey day. To build this
measure, they convert weekly or 48 hour labor supply (depending on survey/country) to minutes per 24 hours.
We collected information on annual labor supply, asking respondents for the number of days they spent during the
last year on each income-generating activity and the number of hours worked during a typical working day. Using
this information, we build a measure of the number of hours worked during an average day during the last year in
each activity, and multiply this by 60 to get minutes per day. Banerjee et al. (2015a) aggregate individuals’ labor
supply, however many adults were surveyed. Across countries, this ranges from one to seven adults per household.
We collected individual labor supply information by work activity (separating self-employment from wage-labor)
only for the main female respondent and (when applicable) for the male head of the household. Thus, we report
the labor supply of the female respondent (in Column 5) and the pooled value for both respondents (in Column
6) for those households that had a male respondent. As in Banerjee et al. (2015a), we standardize each measure
using the control group’s mean for each survey wave.
The dependent variable in Column 7 is an income and revenues index, as reported by the main female respondent.
Banerjee et al. (2015a) use five variables to construct this index: (i) household livestock revenue per month;
(ii) household agricultural income per month; (iii) household non-farm micro-enterprise income per month; (iv)
household income from paid labor per month; (v) self-reported economic status (0/1) which is defined based on
the classification of household economic status on a ladder from 0 to 10. We collected information on all except
the last indicator, so we use variables (i)-(iv) to construct the index. We did not ask for total household income
by activity, but we did ask for each household member’s income from each income-generating activity he/she was
engaged in. In order to avoid double-counting of income from household businesses, we only use the earnings of
the main female respondent.
The dependent variable in Column 8 is a physical health index consisting of three variables. Banerjee et al.
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(2015a) use three variables to measure physical health: (i) activities of daily living scores based on respondents’
self-reported ability (on a binary (0/1) scale) to perform the following physical tasks: lift a heavy object, work all
day in the field, walk a certain distance without getting tired; these are averaged to give the daily living score; (ii)
no adult member missed any work days due to illness; (iii) self-perception of physical health on a scale from 1-5
based on asking respondents about their satisfaction with their physical health. We build corresponding variables
using our data as follows: for (i), we use information on whether the respondent would be able to perform five
physical activities on a scale from 1 to 3 where 1=easily, 2=with trouble and 3=unable. We rescale these so that
higher values imply better health status and take the average to build the index. The physical activities we asked
about were: walking one mile at a normal speed, carrying a heavy load (e.g. 10 seer rice) for 20 yards, drawing
a pail of water from a tube-well, standing up from a sitting position on the floor without help, using a ladder to
climb to a storage place at least 5 feet high. For (ii), we use information on whether any household member had an
illness in the 15 days before the survey, and if so whether this “interfered with any income-generating activity”. For
(iii), we use data on the respondent’s self-perception of her current health on a 3-point scale (1=good, 2=average,
3=bad), scaled such that higher values imply better health status.
The dependent variable in Column 9 is a mental health index consisting of two variables. Banerjee et al. (2015a)
use three indicators to construct this index: (i) self-reported happiness (in some countries based on satisfaction
with mental health on a scale from 1 to 10, in others based on satisfaction with life on a scale from 1 to 5); (ii) a
stress index (for which specific indicators vary across countries) which combines z-scores based on the number of
times in the past week that the respondent felt sad, cried a lot, did not feel like eating, did not feel like working,
had restless sleep, or whether the respondent had a period of worry lasting at least 30 days in a year; (iii) a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the respondent did not experience worry that lasted for more than one month. For (i), we
used a variable describing how the respondent considers her life in terms of happiness on a scale from 1 to 3 where
3=very happy, 2=happy and 1=unhappy. We do not have corresponding variables that can be used to construct
indicator (ii). For (iii), we asked respondents whether they experienced any mental anxiety that “hampered their
daily activities” during the past month (giving a binary variable). We rescaled indicators such that higher values
imply better outcomes and then constructed the aggregate index using the same steps as Banerjee et al. (2015a).
The dependent variable in Column 10 is a political awareness index. Banerjee et al. (2015a) use four indicators
to construct this index: (i) whether the respondent voted in the last election; (ii) whether the respondent was a
member of a political party; (iii) whether the respondent attended a village meeting in the last year; (iv) whether
the respondent has spoken with village leaders about village concerns in the last year. We do not have corresponding
measures in our data. Instead, we build a measure based on information on whether or not the respondent knows
politicians at different levels and the lowest legal age for voting. We have five binary variables, each equal to 1 if
the respondent can correctly name the president, the prime minister, a parliamentary member from her area and
a ward member, and whether she knows the lowest legal age for voting.
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The dependent variable in Column 11 is a women’s empowerment index. Banerjee et al. (2015a) use five
indicators to construct this index: (i) female respondent has major say on food decisions; (ii) female respondent
has major say on education decisions; (iii) female respondent has major say on health decisions (personal and
family); (iv) female respondent has major say on home improvement decisions; (v) female respondent has major
say on how to manage household finances. In our survey, we did not ask respondents whether or not they have
the “major say” in the household, but we did ask whether they could influence household decision-making under
various scenarios. In particular, we asked about the following scenarios: (1) If your household is going to buy land
and you think it is not the right time, can you influence them to do it later?; (2) If your household is going to repair
your house and you think it is not the right time, can you influence them to do it later?; (3) If your household
is going to borrow from a source that you think is not the right source, can you influence them to change their
decision?; (4) If you wish to be involved in a new activity would you need to gain permission from other household
members?; (5) If you think your husband should take up a new activity, can you influence him to do that?; (6) If
you think your son should take up a new activity, can you influence him to do that?; (7) If you think your daughter
should take up a new activity, can you influence her to do that?; (8) Can you influence the decision on how far
your son proceeds with his studies?; (9) Can you influence the decision on how far your daughter proceeds with
her studies?; (10) If your husband is not spending as much on your children’s clothing as you would like him to,
can you make him spend more?; (11) If someone in the household is ill, would you be able to influence the decision
about whether to seek outside treatment or not?; (12) If someone in the household is ill, would you be able to
influence the decision about what type of treatment to seek?; We use the responses to these questions (all measured
as binary (0/1) variables) to construct the women’s empowerment index.
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Table A.I: Features of Rural Labor Markets for Women
Village Level Statistics, Measured Pre-Intervention
Means, standard deviation in parentheses
Self Employment
(1) Agriculture (2) Domestic Maid
(3) Livestock Rearing
[Cows, Goats]
(4) t-test
[Col 1 = Col 3]
(5) t-test
[Col 2 = Col 3]
Days per year 127 167 334
(65.9) (89.5) (41.2)
Hours per day 7.62 7.04 1.83
(1.15) (1.74) (.771)
Hourly earnings [USD] .344 .268 .719
(.102) (.109) (.779)
[.000] [.000]
Notes: All statistics are constructed at the village level, using baseline data from both treatment and control villages. The number of villages is 1309. In
Column 3, livestock comprises cows and/or goats. To reduce sensitivity to outliers, the hours per day and hourly earnings variables are computed by first
taking the median value for each activity in a village, and then averaging these across all villages. Columns 4 and 5 report p-values on a t-test of the equality
of some of these outcomes between the two forms of casual wage labor (agriculture and domestic maid work) and livestock rearing. All monetary amounts are
PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Casual Wage Labor
[.000] [.000]
[.000] [.000]
Sample: Ultra-Poor Women and their Households
(1) Treated Villages (2) Control Villages
(3) t-test
[Treatment=Control]
(4) Normalized
Differences
A. Labor Market Outcomes
Hours devoted to livestock rearing (cows/goats) 115 129 .584 -.036
(258) (275)
Earnings from livestock rearing 7.85 8.90 .654 -.013
(53.2) (60.4)
Hours devoted to agricultural labor 269 237 .740 .042
(537) (539)
Hourly wage in agricultural labor .330 .360 .431 -.195
(.103) (.114)
Hours devoted to domestic maid 325 479 .013 -.152
(651) (774)
Hourly wage in maid services .256 .261 .823 -.028
(.107) (.113)
Earnings from casual labor 164 191 .340 -.085
(218) (239)
Total earnings 241 289 .172 -.117
(275) (300)
Total days worked in the past year 247 259 .327 -.060
(141) (130)
Average standardized difference (p-value) .207
B. Poverty, Expenditures and Financial Wealth
Below the $1.25 a day poverty line [yes=1] .556 .584 .524 -.040
(.400) (.398)
Consumption expenditure, per adult equivalent 629 613 .501 .047
(246) (236)
Value of household assets 36 37 .829 -.011
(48) (63)
Household savings 6.2 9.2 .071 -.059
(28) (43)
Household receives loans .20 .18 .441 -.044
(.40) (.38)
Household gives loans .011 .014 .356 -.022
(.10) (.12)
Average standardized difference (p-value) .849
C. Productive Assets
Cows value 36 30 .575 .023
(176) (166)
Goats value 6.5 8.5 .261 -.050
(25) (31)
Household rents in land [yes=1] .058 .061 .875 -.007
(.235) (.239)
Household owns land [yes=1] .068 .062 .738 .017
(.252) (.241)
Value of land owned 175 238 .390 -.027
(997) (2190)
Value of other business assets 23 23 .991 -.0004
(79) (101)
Average standardized difference (p-value) .863
Notes: All data refers to the baseline survey. Columns 1 and 2 report means with standard deviation in parentheses, based on ultra-poor women/households in treatment and
control villages respectively. Column 3 reports the p-value of the test of equal means, allowing for standard errors to be clustered by BRAC Branch. Column 4 reports
normalized differences computed as the difference in means in treatment and control villages divided by the square root of the sum of the variances. The poverty line
threshold used is $1.25 per person per day, as measured in 2007 prices. Household savings refer to value of savings held at home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving
guards. The household livestock value includes the value of cows and goats. Business assets include pumps, livestock sheds, trees, rickshaws and others. Consumption
expenditure is defined as total household consumption expenditure over the previous year divided by adult equivalents in the household. The adult equivalence scale gives
weight .5 to each child younger than 10. The expenditure items covered are: food, fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles,
dowries, education, charity and legal expenses. At the foot of each Panel we report the p-value associated with the average standardized difference, defined as in Kling et al.
(2007). All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Table A.II: Balance
OLS Estimates
Sample: All Ultra-Poor Women at Baseline
Dependent Variable=1 if Respondent is Surveyed in All Three Waves
Standard Errors Clustered by Village in Parentheses
(1) (2) (3)
Treated village .0139 .014 .012
(.011) (.011) (.014)
Hours devoted to agriculture day labor .000 -.000
(.001) (.001)
Hours devoted to domestic maid -.000 -.000
(.001) (.001)
Hours devoted to livestock rearing .009*** .008***
(.002) (.002)
Hours devoted to agriculture day labor x Treated village .000
(.001)
Hours devoted to domestic maid x Treated village -.000
(.001)
Hours devoted to livestock rearing x Treated village .002
(.003)
Subdistrict Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Attrition Rate: Baseline to Endline
Adjusted R-squared .003 .007 .007
Observations (number of ultra-poor women) 7953 7953 7953
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. OLS estimates are reported based on the sample of ultra-poor women
observed at baseline. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the woman is observed in all three survey waves (baseline,
two-year midline, four-year endline), and zero otherwise. All specifications control for the level effect of the treatment and sub-district fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered by village.
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Table A.III: Attrition
Table A.IV: Allocation of Labor of Household Members of the Ultra-Poor
DiD ITT 4-year Estimates
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
Each Coefficient Corresponds to a Separate Regression
(1) Husbands
(2) Adult members
(16 and older)
(3) Children
(15 and younger)
Capital Intensive Activities
Hours devoted to rearing livestock 59.0*** 54.6*** 41.3**
(18.7) (9.14) (15.4)
Hours devoted to land cultivation 16.1 21.7*** 7.67**
(16.4) (5.21) (3.06)
Hours devoted to rickshaw driving -38.5 .483 -11.0**
(30.2) (9.82) (4.76)
Casual Wage Labor Activities
Hours devoted to agriculture day labor -85.4 6.22 11.1
(123) (24.8) (12.9)
Hours devoted to domestic servant - -4.06 -3.53
- (10.8) (22.1)
Total Hours Worked and Schooling
Total hours worked -18.1 116** 60.3
(177) (46.3) (39.3)
Share enrolled in school - - -.008
(.025)
Number of households
Observations (clusters) 11731 (40) 12043 (40) 11407 (40)
6732
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Intent-to-treat estimates are reported based on a difference-in-
difference specification estimated using OLS. This regresses the outcome of interest for individual i in village v in survey wave t on a
constant, a dummy for whether the individual resides in a treated village, dummies for the two follow-up survey waves (two and four
years post-intervention), the interaction between the treatment assignment dummy and each survey wave dummy, and a set of strata
(sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are those on the treatment-survey wave interaction terms. Each coefficient
corresponds to a separate regression. The sample includes individuals in the same household as an ultra-poor woman. Standard
errors are clustered by BRAC branch area. All outcomes are measured at the individual level, and defined for the year prior to survey
date. Livestock rearing refers to working with cows/goats.
Table A.V.A: Treatment Effects, ANCOVA Specification Separately for Each Survey Wave
ANCOVA ITT Estimates - Separate regressions for each survey wave
Sample: Ultra Poor Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
Panel A: Labor Supply
(1) Hours (2) Days (3) Hours (4) Days (5) Hours (6) Days (7) Hours (8) Days
Program impact after 2 years 482.783*** 196.672*** -23.821 -2.109 -157.780*** -21.349*** 222.417*** 61.122***
(23.75) (6.17) (16.61) (2.34) (17.48) (2.87) (43.90) (3.22)
Program impact after 4 years 420.271*** 170.737*** -25.764 -2.770 -247.235*** -33.474*** 84.428 54.149***
(27.89) (8.25) (23.42) (2.99) (28.73) (3.61) (51.34) (4.96)
Panel B: Earnings Livestock All Activities
(9) Earnings (10) Wage (11) Earnings (12) Wage (13) Earnings (14) Earnings
Program impact after 2 years 80.031*** 0.011 -4.010 0.026*** -31.783*** 25.105
(10.30) (0.02) (7.80) (0.01) (5.12) (16.23)
Program impact after 4 years 120.465*** 0.041*** 3.380 0.073*** -54.863*** 58.178***
(8.24) (0.01) (9.86) (0.01) (6.71) (18.47)
Panel C: Consumption, Household and Financial Assets
(1) Below
Poverty Line
(2) Consumption
Expenditure (per
adult equivalent)
(3) Value of
Household
Assets
(4) Household
Cash Savings
(5) Household
Receives
Loans
(6) Household
Gives Loans
Program impact after 2 years -0.089*** 53.905*** 6.715** 50.230*** 0.107*** 0.039***
(0.01) (8.21) (3.16) (3.77) (0.02) (0.01)
Program impact after 4 years -0.109*** 80.333*** 39.218*** 50.926*** 0.095*** 0.047***
(0.02) (9.74) (4.97) (3.24) (0.02) (0.01)
(1) Value of
Cows
(2) Value of
Goats
(3) Rents Land (4) Owns Land
(5) Value of
Land owned
(6) Value of
Other
Business
Assets
Program impact after 2 years 493.088*** 27.659*** 0.071*** 0.007 30.166 26.657***
(13.24) (2.47) (0.01) (0.01) (52.69) (4.91)
Program impact after 4 years 564.599*** 19.795*** 0.115*** 0.028*** 303.431*** 64.064***
(30.05) (2.85) (0.01) (0.01) (71.57) (7.61)
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates from separate yearly ANCOVA specifications. These regress the outcome of interest
on a constant, a dummy for whether the household resides in a treated village, the value of the outcome of interest at baseline, and a set of strata (sub-district) fixed effects. They do so
separately using either the outcome data from the 2009 survey wave, or from the 2011 survey wave. The coefficients shown are those on the treatment dummy. All monetary amounts
are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Panel D: Productive Assets
Livestock Agriculture Maid All Activities
Agriculture Maid
Financial AssetsPoverty and Consumption
Table A.V.B: Treatment Effects, ANCOVA Specification Pooling All Survey Waves
ANCOVA ITT Estimates - Pooled
Sample: Ultra Poor Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
Panel A: Labor Supply
(1) Hours (2) Days (3) Hours (4) Days (5) Hours (6) Days (7) Hours (8) Days
Program impact after 2 years 487.909*** 200.584*** -21.072 -1.658 -169.546*** -22.788*** 225.206*** 63.365***
(29.12) (8.33) (23.10) (3.14) (22.37) (3.48) (51.62) (4.63)
Program impact after 4 years 415.145*** 166.826*** -28.514 -3.222 -235.469*** -32.035*** 81.638 51.905***
(31.51) (9.47) (27.62) (3.56) (33.49) (4.35) (56.39) (5.72)
Panel B: Earnings Livestock All Activities
(9) Earnings (10) Wage (11) Earnings (12) Wage (13) Earnings (14) Earnings
Program impact after 2 years 82.636*** 0.021 -2.638 0.033*** -37.821*** 27.125
(12.24) (0.02) (9.71) (0.01) (6.42) (20.97)
Program impact after 4 years 118.001*** 0.030** 2.428 0.062*** -53.472*** 55.011**
(10.75) (0.01) (11.28) (0.02) (8.43) (22.02)
Panel C: Consumption, Household and Financial Assets
(1) Below
Poverty Line
(2) Consumption
Expenditure (per
adult equivalent)
(3) Value of
Household
Assets
(4) Household
Cash Savings
(5) Household
Receives
Loans
(6) Household
Gives Loans
Program impact after 2 years -0.083*** 51.099*** 6.453 51.191*** 0.107*** 0.041***
(0.02) (11.07) (4.14) (4.09) (0.03) (0.01)
Program impact after 4 years -0.116*** 85.399*** 39.479*** 49.783*** 0.093*** 0.050***
(0.02) (11.70) (5.58) (3.77) (0.03) (0.01)
(1) Value of
Cows
(2) Value of
Goats
(3) Rents Land (4) Owns Land
(5) Value of
Land owned
(6) Value of
Other
Business
Assets
Program impact after 2 years 501.148*** 27.622*** 0.073*** 0.007 24.210 24.905***
(20.84) (2.57) (0.02) (0.01) (61.84) (6.90)
Program impact after 4 years 556.569*** 19.909*** 0.113*** 0.028*** 309.408*** 65.824***
(30.80) (2.92) (0.01) (0.01) (83.37) (8.15)
All Activities
Agriculture Maid
Poverty and Consumption Financial Assets
Panel D: Productive Assets
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates from ANCOVA specifications. These regress the outcome of interest on a dummy for
whether the household resides in a treated village interacted with each of the two period dummies, the period dummies, the value of the outcome of interest at baseline interacted with
each of the two period dummies, and a set of strata (sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are those on the treatment dummy interacted with each of the two period
dummies. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Livestock Agriculture Maid
Sample: Ultra-Poor Women and Their Households
(1) P-value based on
clustered standard
errors as in text
(2) P-value based on
clustered standard errors
adjusted for degrees of
freedom (Young 2016)
(3) P-value based on wild-
bootstrap clustered
standard errors
(Cameron et al 2008)
A. Labor Market Outcomes (Table 4)
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.430 0.438 0.394
Program impact after 4 years 0.286 0.295 0.324
Program impact after 2 years 0.617 0.623 0.579
Program impact after 4 years 0.386 0.394 0.434
Program impact after 2 years 0.189 0.198 0.194
Program impact after 4 years 0.013 0.015 0.018
Program impact after 2 years 0.159 0.167 0.170
Program impact after 4 years 0.006 0.008 0.008
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.008 0.009 0.012
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.187 0.216 0.236
Program impact after 4 years 0.031 0.047 0.074
Program impact after 2 years 0.479 0.487 0.436
Program impact after 4 years 0.782 0.786 0.835
Program impact after 2 years 0.130 0.142 0.188
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.001 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.318 0.327 0.324
Program impact after 4 years 0.035 0.040 0.030
Program impact after 2 years 0.046 0.051 0.052
Program impact after 4 years 0.004 0.005 0.004
B. Poverty, Expenditures and Financial Wealth (Table 5)
Program impact after 2 years 0.283 0.292 0.324
Program impact after 4 years 0.032 0.036 0.030
Program impact after 2 years 0.241 0.250 0.270
Program impact after 4 years 0.005 0.006 0.006
Program impact after 2 years 0.351 0.360 0.384
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.001 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.002 0.002 0.002
Program impact after 2 years 0.003 0.003 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
C. Productive Assets
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.002 0.002 0.004
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
Program impact after 2 years 0.646 0.652 0.655
Program impact after 4 years 0.053 0.058 0.070
Program impact after 2 years 0.600 0.606 0.617
Program impact after 4 years 0.017 0.020 0.020
Program impact after 2 years 0.001 0.002 0.000
Program impact after 4 years 0.000 0.000 0.000
All three activities: earning
Value of other business
assets
Below the $1.25 a day
poverty line [yes=1]
Consumption expenditure,
per adult equivalent
Value of household assets
Household savings
Household receives loans
Household gives loans
Cows value
Goats value
Household rents in land
[yes=1]
Household owns land
[yes=1]
Value of land owned
Table A.VI: Inference Robustness
Maid: Hours
Maid: Days
All Three Activities: Hours
Notes: We report alternative p-values for the 4 year treatment effects estimated in Tables 4 , 5 and 6. Column 1 reports the p-value based on clustered standard errors as
reported in the main text. Column 2 reports the p-value based on clustered standard errors with the degrees of freedom adjustment as in Young (2016). Column 3 reports the
p-value based on clustered standard errors computed using the wild bootstrap method of Cameron et al . (2008).
Livestock: Hours
Livestock: Days
Agriculture: Hours
Agriculture: Days
All Three Activities: Days
Livestock: Earnings
Agriculture: Wage
Agriculture: Earnings
Maid: wage
Maid: earnings
Panel A. External parameters
Cost per household at year 0 1121.34 Social discount rate = 5%
Cost per household discounted at year 4 1363.00
Panel B. Estimated Consumption Benefits q10 q25 q50 q75 q90
1 Change in household consumption expenditure year 1 -3 30 44 107 194
2 Change in household consumption expenditure year 2 -5 51 76 184 335
3 Change in household consumption expenditure year 3 62 126 157 312 540
4 Change in household consumption expenditure year 4 123 188 223 410 694
5 NPV Change in household consumption expenditure year 5 and beyond-forever 1279 1955 2313 4256 7199
NPV Change in household consumption expenditure from year 5 for 10 years 625 956 1131 2081 3521
NPV Change in household consumption expenditure year 5 and 6 117 179 212 390 661
NPV Change in household consumption expenditure from year 5 for 20 years discount 10% 937 1433 1695 3119 5276
6 Change in household assets year 4 14 11 20 47 81
7 Total benefits (1+2+3+4+5+6) 2537 4174 4977 9260 15715
2084 3277 3899 7243 12288
1576 2500 2981 5553 9428
2396 3753 4463 8281 14043
1472.58 2331.87 2788.79 5209.01 8848.84
8 Benefits/cost ratio 1.08 1.73 2.08 3.90 6.63
Sensitivity to different discount rates/time horizons
Social discount rate = 10% 0.83 1.35 1.62 3.07 5.22
Benefits last 10 years from transfer date 0.60 1.00 1.21 2.30 3.94
Benefits last 5 years from transfer date 0.23 0.43 0.54 1.06 1.84
9 IRR
Sensitivity to different outside options/time horizons
Wage jobs available all year at $.34 per hour -0.03 0.05 0.08 0.21 0.35
Benefits last 10 years from transfer date -0.01 0.07 0.10 0.24 0.39
Benefits last 5 years from transfer date -0.26 -0.15 -0.11 0.07 0.26
Panel C. Estimated Asset Benefits
10 Change in productive assets year 4 120.42 92.20 699.89 1162.95 1485.05
11 Change in financial assets year 4 53.95 9.53 30.93 61.00 112.08
12 0.30 0.18 1.20 2.03 2.68Increase in assets /asset cost
Notes: Household consumption includes: food (both purchased and produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles, dowries, education,
charity and legal expenses. Productive assets include livestock, land, agricultural equipment and other machinery used for production. Financial assets equal the value of savings (held at
home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards) plus loans owed to the HH minus loans the HHs owes to others. The IRR is based on estimated non-durable consumption gains,
assuming that these last for the expected productive life of the beneficiaries, set at 20 years. When we assume that wage jobs are always available at the observed agricultural wage we
deduct the estimated increase in labor supply (219 hours) multiplied by wage the from consumption benefits. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and
deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Table A.VII: Quantile Cost-Benefit Analysis
ANCOVA ITT Estimates: Household Level Outcomes
Sample: Ultra Poor Households
Standard Errors in Parentheses, Clustered by BRAC Branch Area
PANEL A: Each survey wave separately
(1) Household
Consumption Expenditure
(2) Value of
Household Assets
(3) Household
Cash Savings
(4) Value of
Productive Assets
Program impact after 2 years 219.5*** 6.031 45.79*** 574.7***
(24.24) (3.664) (5.607) (106.9)
Program impact after 4 years 417.4*** 40.18*** 53.38*** 1013.4***
(24.01) (5.353) (4.006) (149.6)
Program impact after 7 years 353.7*** 29.25*** 22.31*** 708.3***
(32.16) (7.987) (4.330) (134.6)
PANEL B: All survey waves pooled
Program impact after 2 years 198.7*** 7.264 48.34*** 556.2***
(46.47) (5.165) (6.009) (142.8)
Program impact after 4 years 441.7*** 41.55*** 51.35*** 1017.0***
(57.32) (7.258) (5.040) (158.6)
Program impact after 7 years 347.9*** 26.52** 21.68*** 721.3***
(83.85) (9.839) (4.496) (184.8)
Notes: *** (**) (*) indicates significance at the 1% (5%) (10%) level. Intent-to-treat (ITT) estimates from ANCOVA specifications. In Panel A we restrict the sample to each of the three periods
(2,4 and 7 years) and regress the outcome of interest on a constant, a dummy for whether the household resides in a treated village, the value of the outcome of interest at baseline, and a set of
strata (sub-district) fixed effects. In Panel B we regress the outcome of interest on a dummy for whether the household resides in a treated village interacted with each of the two period dummies,
the period dummies, the value of the outcome of interest at baseline interacted with each of the two period dummies, and a set of strata (sub-district) fixed effects. The coefficients shown are
those on the treatment dummy. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In 2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
Table A.VIII: Seven-Year Treatment Effects on Consumption, Savings and Assets of Ultra-Poor
Households-ANCOVA
A. Consumption Expenditure (per adult equivalent) B. Value of Household Assets
C. Savings D. Value of Productive Assets
Figure A.I: Four-Year Quantile Treatment Effects on Non-Eligible Households
Notes: Quantile treatment effect (QTE) estimates of the differences in outcomes between four-year follow-up and baseline are presented in each panel. Each specification controls for randomization
strata. Bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (using 500 replications) are based on standard errors clustered by BRAC branch. Consumption expenditure includes: food (both purchased and
produced), fuel, cosmetics, entertainment, transportation, utilities, clothing, footwear, utensils, textiles, dowries, education, charity and legal expenses. Household assets include jewelry, sarees,
radio, television, mobile phones, furniture, etc. Productive assets include livestock, land, agricultural equipment and other machinery used for production. Savings equal the total value of savings
held at home, at any bank, at any MFI and with saving guards. All monetary amounts are PPP-adjusted USD terms, set at 2007 prices and deflated using CPI published by Bangladesh Bank. In
2007, 1USD=18.46TK PPP.
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